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ARTICLE
DESIGNING WITHOUT PRIVACY
Ari Ezra Waldman ∗
ABSTRACT
In Privacy on the Ground, the law and information scholars
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan showed that
empowered chief privacy officers (CPOs) are pushing their
companies to take consumer privacy seriously by integrating
privacy into the designs of new technologies. Their work was just
the beginning of a larger research agenda. CPOs may set policies
at the top, but they alone cannot embed robust privacy norms into
the corporate ethos, practice, and routine. As such, if we want the
mobile apps, websites, robots, and smart devices we use to respect
our privacy, we need to institutionalize privacy throughout the
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corporations that make them. In particular, privacy must be a
priority among those actually doing the work of design on the
ground—namely, engineers, computer programmers, and other
technologists.
This Article presents the initial findings from an
ethnographic study of how, if at all, those designing technology
products think about privacy, integrate privacy into their work,
and consider user needs in the design process. It also looks at how
attorneys at private firms draft privacy notices for their clients
and interact with designers. Based on these findings, this Article
suggests that Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s narrative is not yet
fully realized. The account among some engineers and lawyers,
where privacy is narrow, limited, and barely factoring into design,
may help explain why so many products seem to ignore our privacy
expectations. The Article then proposes a framework for
understanding how factors both exogenous (theory and law) and
endogenous (corporate structure and individual cognitive frames
and experience) to the corporation prevent the CPOs’ robust
privacy norms from diffusing throughout technology companies
and the industry as a whole. This framework also helps suggest
how specific reforms at every level—theory, law, organization, and
individual experience—can incentivize companies to take privacy
seriously, enhance organizational learning, and eliminate the
cognitive biases that lead to discrimination in design.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION.. .................................................................. 661

II. PRIVACY ON THE GROUND TODAY ........................................ 666
A. Notice-and-Choice and Its Critiques............................ 667
B. Chief Privacy Officers .................................................. 670
III. TWO PRIVACY NARRATIVES .................................................. 674
A. Designing Without Privacy .......................................... 675
B. Technologists and Lawyers Discuss Privacy ............... 678
1. The Meaning of “Privacy” ..................................... 681
2. Privacy and the Design Process. ........................... 685
3. The Role of the User .............................................. 689
4. Technologists, Lawyers, and Privacy
Professionals. .............................................................. 693
5. Implications. .......................................................... 696
IV. EMBEDDING ROBUST PRIVACY NORMS INTO DESIGN ............. 701
A. Conceptualizing Privacy for Design............................. 703

Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)

2018]

2/12/2018 12:12 AM

DESIGNING WITHOUT PRIVACY

661

B.
C.

Privacy Law as an Incentive to Act.............................. 705
Organizational Structure and Organizational
Learning ....................................................................... 711
D. The Embodied Experience of Designers on the
Ground ......................................................................... 716

V.

CONCLUSION….. .................................................................. 725
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Privacy on the Ground, Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre
Mulligan showed that empowered chief privacy officers (CPOs) are
creating strong data protection policies that put users and user
trust first. 1 Their research opened our eyes to the fact that
American privacy law today is more than just statutes, 2 Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement actions, 3 and the litigation
and policymaking of state attorneys general. 4 Rather, where the
laws on the books remain as fragmented and incomplete as ever,
corporate CPOs are going further, filling in gaps on the ground. 5
1. KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND:
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 6 (2015) [hereinafter
BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND]. Bamberger and Mulligan also
published their initial research and preliminary arguments in the Stanford Law Review.
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground,
63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) [hereinafter Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books].
This Article pulls from both sources.
2. State privacy laws are too numerous to list. Federal privacy laws include, but are
not limited to, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (credit
histories), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1232g
(school records), the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (personal information maintain
by government), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522, 2701–2709 (protection against federal surveillance and electronic searches), and the
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (video rentals), among many
others. For a more comprehensive list, please see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 37–39 (4th ed. 2011).
3. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 135–305 (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 627–28 (2014).
4. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 758 (2017). Bamberger and Mulligan’s research was
international in scope; they interviewed CPOs from the United States and several countries
in Europe. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 6. They
found that American (and German) CPOs expressed a robust, user-focused and trust-based
vision of privacy. Id. at 6–7. Because that narrative existed in the United States and seemed
counterintuitive given the many gaps in U.S. privacy law on the books, this Article focuses
exclusively on U.S.-based technologists and lawyers and makes recommendations for
changes to U.S. law and corporate organization. Id. at 6.
5. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 6.
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Their research, which is described in Part II, changed the
privacy law discussion: previously, privacy scholarship mostly
ignored the contributions of privacy professionals. 6 But their work
raises additional research questions. Have the CPOs’ efforts been
fully realized? Are these robust, user-focused privacy norms
embedded throughout the technology industry? And, are these
norms being integrated into technology product design?
Bamberger and Mulligan argued that American CPOs are
taking advantage of gaps in U.S. privacy law to innovate and solve
problems creatively, adopting a far more user-friendly approach to
their companies’ data privacy obligations than the law on the
books would seem to require. 7 But that user-friendly approach
does not always make its way into design; Snapchat, 8 the initial
version of Pokémon Go, 9 and Uber’s mobile app, 10 among others,
seem to have been designed without our privacy in mind. In these
cases, any “company law” of privacy is not being operationalized
on the ground.
This Article explores that divergence, some of the reasons for
it, and how to fix it. CPOs may set policies at the top, and they
may have the ears of corporate executives, 11 but they alone cannot
embed robust privacy norms into the corporate ethos, practice, and
routine. Nor do they design the very data hungry products that
scream out for privacy protection. There are other people involved.
Engineers, coders, and other technologists create the platforms
and products that sweep in user data. Attorneys work with their
corporate clients to turn internal data use practices into privacy
policies. A phalanx of product managers shepherd concepts from
beginning to end. For a CPO’s vision of privacy to make its way
into her company’s products, these workers have to implement it.
As such, any narrative of privacy on the ground cannot stop with
6. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 249.
7. Id. at 250–51, 304–05. Their research was international in scope. They found that
German and American CPOs were able to innovate in ways their counterparts in other
countries could not. Id. at 6–7. I focus on the domestic side of their work because my
ethnographic research was restricted to the United States.
8. Complaint, In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., FTC File No. 132 3078, Docket No. C-4501
(F.T.C. May 8, 2014) [hereinafter, Snapchat Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatcmpt.pdf.
9. See Laura Hudson, How to Protect Privacy While Using Pokémon Go and Other
Apps, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/technology/
personaltech/how-to-protect-privacy-while-using-pokemon-go-and-other-apps.html?_r=0.
10. See Lily Hay Newman, Uber Didn’t Track Users Who Deleted the App, but it Still
Broke the Rules, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2017 6:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/uberdidnt-track-users-deleted-app-still-broke-rules/ (discussing the Uber app’s use of
fingerprinting to identify users even after they have deleted the app from their phones).
11. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 12.
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CPOs. 12 If we want the mobile apps, websites, robots, and smart
devices we use to respect our privacy, we need to institutionalize
robust privacy norms throughout the corporations that make
them, including among those designing the products we use every
day.
What follows are the preliminary and partial results 13 of an
interdisciplinary study about the ways some designers and
lawyers think about privacy and the factors that prevent—and
those that foster—the institutionalization of robust privacy norms
throughout a corporation. Relying on scholarship on management
structure, the sociology of organizations, and my own field
research in the form of semi-structured interviews and
observations of product development, this Article makes three
arguments. First, the designers and lawyers I interviewed think
about user privacy narrowly and in starkly different terms than
the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s study. 14 Second, it is the
designer’s vision of privacy that is operationalized into the
products they create because they are the ones tasked with design.
Third, factors both exogenous and endogenous to the corporation
hinder the diffusion of robust privacy norms. Those factors are
ambiguous privacy theory, lax U.S. legal approaches to privacy,
siloed organizational structure, and isolated and homogeneous
design teams. Changes in those four areas can provide the
necessary incentives, enhance organizational learning, and help
embed strong privacy norms throughout a company. In short, this
Article suggests that a robust, user-focused vision of privacy can
only translate into design if the designers are on board.
The interviews on which this Article is based focused on
technologists and lawyers in the high technology sector, including
those working at leading technology companies, mobile apps, and
tech start-ups. Many of them had similar views on privacy, the role
of the user, and design. At the same time, their views were
12. Id. at 83.
13. This Article is part of a larger research project on the role played by engineers,
lawyers, marketing professionals, venture capitalists, and other workers in considering
privacy protections and privacy principles in design. Interviews with these research
subjects is ongoing. This Article focuses exclusively on interviews with engineers and coders
designing technology products and lawyers who work on privacy notices. Future research
will consider the broader population of workers on the ground.
14. This conclusion is not surprising, though this Article is the first to describe
technologists’ vision of privacy and how that vision factors into design. In the intellectual
property context, at least, there is evidence to suggest that creative actors tend to think
about their work, process, and goals differently than those who make laws and policies
about creative artifacts. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS,
AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (2015).
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remarkably different from the views of the CPOs in Bamberger
and Mulligan’s study. To many, “information privacy” boiled down
to giving users notice, much like privacy law on the books. 15 Many
thought privacy was synonymous with encryption: that is, internal
security priorities crowded out any consumer-focused privacy
concerns. Few engineers remembered meeting with lawyers or
privacy professionals one-on-one to discuss integrating privacy
considerations into their work; some attended short assemblies on
security, generally. Many found it difficult to design with user
needs in mind; therefore, engineer-only design teams not only
minimized the importance of privacy, but also missed how their
designs impacted consumers. 16 This research, discussed in more
detail in Part III, suggests that, at least among most of the
interviewees, Bamberger and Mulligan’s narrative about privacy
has not yet been fully realized.
There could be many explanations for this divergence of
views. Part IV proposes a framework for understanding how
factors exogenous (theory and law) and endogenous (corporate
organization and employee experiences) to the corporation are
hindering norm diffusion. Fortunately, changes in all four of these
areas can help fully realize the more robust privacy norms from
Privacy on the Ground.
As a matter of privacy theory, the dominant rights-based
notion of privacy, or the idea that privacy is about giving users
choice and control over the dissemination of their data, reduces
corporate privacy obligations to posting privacy policies. Any
ambiguity as to how to conceptualize privacy among those that
recognize that privacy can mean different things to different
people at different times makes it difficult for practitioners on the
ground to turn theory into practice. 17 However, conceptualizing
privacy as based on relationships of trust would not only ground
the CPOs’ vision of privacy with theoretical rigor, but also create
a robust privacy-as-trust discourse to compete with the governing
autonomy- and rights-based notions of privacy. 18
15. Telephone interview with former engineer at LinkedIn (Oct. 5, 2016) (notes on
file with Author).
16. See Steve Woolgar, Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A
SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION 70–74 (John
Law ed., 1991) (noting users are constrained and “configured” by designs of new
technologies).
17. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2002)
(“The difficulty in articulating what privacy is and why it is important has often made
privacy law ineffective and blind to the larger purposes for which it must serve.”).
18. See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE 11–45 (2018); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust
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Law has a significant role to play, as well. Sectoral federal
laws and the autonomy-based notion that users only need notice
of data use practices in order to make disclosure decisions 19
provide little incentive for profit-seeking corporations to treat
consumer privacy as anything more than a marketing gimmick.
Treating some technology companies as fiduciaries of our data will
change that. 20 And, as we have seen with the automobile industry,
a strong privacy tort regime can play a critical role in incentivizing
corporations to fully integrate consumer safety demands into their
culture. 21 On a more immediate and practical level, my research
shows that companies who have been the subjects of strong
regulatory intervention are more successful at embedding the
importance of consumer privacy into design. This opens a pathway
Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, at 451–57 (2016) (protecting privacy
can build trust between online platforms and consumers); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as
Trust: Protecting Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559,
563–64 (2015) (arguing that privacy should be conceptualized as based on relationships of
trust between individuals); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1308–10 (2000). For a discussion of how traditional conceptualizations
of privacy are based on notions of autonomy, please see infra Part II.A.
19. United States data privacy law at the federal level is “sectoral.” That is,
rather than a single comprehensive data privacy law, data is regulated only in some
industries—health, financial, or children’s data, for example. Even where it is
regulated, the laws only protect certain data in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Paul M.
Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904–05 (2009); DAVID H. FLAHERTY,
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 404–05 (1992). Notably, state laws
are filling gaps left by a gridlocked Congress. The California Online Privacy Protection Act
(CalOPPA), for example, regulates almost all platforms that collect data on California
residents. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579.
20. Many scholars, including Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, Dan Solove, Danielle
Citron, and others, have recommended a shift toward a fiduciary or trustee model to ensure
corporations take consumer privacy seriously. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 102–03 (2004) (positing that businesses
that are collecting personal information from us should “stand in a fiduciary relationship with
us”); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183, 1186 (2016) (“[M]any online service providers and cloud companies who collect, analyze,
use, sell, and distribute personal information should be seen as information fiduciaries toward
their customers and end-users.”); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to
Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016, 9:48 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/; Danielle
Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries, CONCURRING OPS. (June 19, 2012, 5:08 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06/big-data-brokers-as-fiduciaries.html
(a
fiduciary relationship between data brokers and users would help fight the massive power
imbalance that exists in today’s unregulated environment).
21. Scholars have long argued for a more robust privacy tort regime. See, e.g.,
Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1848 (2010);
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J. 123, 182 (2007); Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are
Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
63, 143 (2003).
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for using robust FTC enforcement to make a difference.
Endogenous factors also play a role. As a long literature on
organizational structures and routines suggests, bureaucratic
barriers within corporations may impede the spread of privacy
norms. 22 In the design context, siloed privacy structures and
engineer-only design teams make it impossible for privacy
professionals to raise and address privacy issues during the design
process. And demographic homogeneity in design teams and the
lack of ethics, diversity, and privacy education in technology
curricula make it difficult for engineers to learn new perspectives
and overcome discriminatory implicit biases. However, changes to
corporate structure, hiring practices, employee social networks,
and technology education can make organizational learning
possible and help embed privacy norms among technologists.
This research is limited. Ethnographic research—especially
ongoing, preliminary research—always is. This Article is based on
a subset of interviews conducted with engineers in the high
technology sector. The views about privacy discussed herein reflect
the views of the interviewees, and even though this Article is based
on interviews with forty technologists and lawyers, the findings
can only point to a vision of privacy among some designers and
lawyers. Further research is necessary, 23 and I consciously offer
only modest conclusions as a result. But this research opens
several scholarship and policy fronts in the fight to protect data
privacy. A rich account of privacy on the ground adds something
new to the privacy law discussion, highlighting the role lawyers
and designers play in implementing privacy on the ground and the
work that may still be necessary to fully realize the vision of CPOs.
II.

PRIVACY ON THE GROUND TODAY

Bamberger and Mulligan conducted their research on
corporate CPOs for two main reasons. First, most critiques of the
American approach to privacy law had focused on the laws on the
books and ignored the contributions of privacy professionals. Many
of those critiques, furthermore, recommended a shift toward a
more European-style comprehensive privacy regime without
22. See, e.g., Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, Structural Inertia and
Organizational Change, 29 AM. SOC. REV. 149, 154–55 (1983) (routines as a source of inertia
in organizations); Howard M. Weiss & Daniel R. Ilgen, Routinized Behavior in
Organizations, 14 J. BEHAV. ECON. 57, 62 (1985) (discussing how routinization can cause
inflexibility). See also MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
153 (A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons, trans. 1947).
23. That additional research will be discussed in the Author’s forthcoming book,
tentatively titled, Designing with Privacy.
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investigating the on-the-ground effects of the current approach.
Second, there had been only one previous study of corporate
privacy practices, and it was published in 1994. Much had changed
since then. 24 Their research not only updated our appreciation for
an industry that was barely in its infancy in 1994, it also helped
explain a paradox. In the twenty years between 1994 and Privacy
on the Ground, which was published in 2015, the United States
had not moved any closer to Europe’s privacy regime. And yet, the
data privacy situation on the ground did not seem as bleak as the
law’s harshest critics expected. Rather, a dynamic professional
class of privacy leaders had emerged to create corporate privacy
programs that seemed attuned to user needs. In this section, I
briefly review the current approach to data privacy law in the
United States and its critiques to put Bamberger and Mulligan’s
research in context. I then briefly summarize their work. As I
discuss later, however, their groundbreaking research focused
primarily on CPOs and executives, leaving open a door to dig
further into the privacy work of technologists, product managers,
and lawyers on the ground.
A. Notice-and-Choice and Its Critiques
European and American approaches to data privacy are
largely based on a series of Fair Information Practices Principles
(FIPPs) that developed out of a 1973 report from the federal
Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 25 The
HEW Report recommended that users be informed of data use
practices, have the opportunity to correct their data, and consent
to any secondary uses of their information. 26 Several years later,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
issued similar guidelines, requiring, for example, that data
gatherers disclose the purpose and scope of data collection, any
security protocols, and all user rights. 27 The FTC got in on the act
24. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 249, 251.
25. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/
[hereinafter “HEW REPORT”]. The Report was “the first portrait of information gathering
and its impact on personal privacy ever provided by the U.S. government.” ROBERT ELLIS
SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEBSITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE
INTERNET 327 (2000).
26. HEW REPORT, supra note 25, at 41–42.
27. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA at
Part II (2001), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyand
transborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm.
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in 2000, urging Congress to require commercial websites to
disclose a similar what-when-how of user data. 28 In so doing, the
FTC identified “notice” as the most important FIPP, and
notice-and-choice then became the dominant approach to
consumer privacy.
The federal laws that regulate the collection, transfer, and use
of some of our data reflect this primary focus on notice-and-choice.
For example, the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which helps protect the privacy of
medical information, 29 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which
gives individuals notice and some control over information held by
certain financial institutions, 30 require covered entities to provide
notice of data use practices. State laws follow suit. For example,
California’s Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) is a
groundbreaking law that requires commercial websites and other
online service operators that collect information about California
residents to, among other things, post a data use policy. 31 Like the
policies envisioned by Gramm-Leach-Bliley and HIPAA,
CalOPPA-compliant policies must contain specific substantive
disclosures: what information is collected, with whom it may be
shared, how the data will be used, and how individuals will be
notified about policy changes. 32
Notice-and-choice is premised on the notion of the
autonomous user. As a doctrine of informed consent, 33 it is
supposed to give us control over our data by giving us the
28. FTC, PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON “PRIVACY
ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE”, BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION § III(1) (May 25, 2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statementfederal-trade-commission-privacy-online/testimonyprivacy.pdf.
29. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
100 Stat. 2548 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d(1)–(9)); 45 C.F.R. 164.528
(2016).
30. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,
Pub. L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809).
31. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579. The law sets a de facto national
standard because companies have an incentive to comply with the strictest law rather than
navigating 50 different requirements. See Citron, supra note 4, at 762.
32. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575(b)(1), (3).
33. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice
Framework, 11 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 518 (2015). The principle of informed
consent, as in the analogous contexts of medical procedures and scientific research, flows directly
from Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means.” IMMANUEL
KANT,
GROUNDWORK
FOR
THE
METAPHYSIC
OF
MORALS
29
(2005),
http://www.stolaf.edu/people/huff/classes/GoodnEvil/Readings/kantgw.pdf. See also Jorge L.
Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 (2016).
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information we need to make rational disclosure decisions.
Autonomy and choice animated the FIPPs and the Clinton
Administration’s “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,”
which stated that “[d]isclosure by data-gatherers is designed to
simulate market resolution of privacy concerns by empowering
individuals . . . . Such disclosure will enable consumers to make
better judgments about the levels of privacy available and their
willingness to participate.” 34 And the FTC has explained that
notice is “essential to ensuring that consumers are properly
informed before divulging personal information.” 35 In other words,
notice-and-choice was meant to give us the tools we needed for
perfectly rational decision-making about our privacy. 36
Critiques of the sectoral and notice-and-choice approaches to
data privacy focus on its underlying theory, substance, and effects
in practice. As a theoretical matter, the notion of the autonomous
user is a myth. 37 And scholars have shown that we do not make
perfectly rational disclosure decisions. 38 For example, Alessandro
Acquisti, Leslie John, and George Loewenstein have found that
disclosure behavior is based on comparative judgments: 39 if we
perceive that others are willing to disclose, we are more likely to
disclose; 40 if we perceive that the information asked of us is
particularly intrusive, we are less likely to disclose. 41 Other
scholars have found that disclosure can be emotionally
34. HEW REPORT, supra note 25, at 41–42. See also President William Jefferson Clinton,
A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce at 13, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 1997),
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html).
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/exploring-privacy-roundtableseries/priv-23a_0.pdf. Notably, these same Kantian principles animate the doctrine of informed
consent in the medical and research contexts.
36. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012).
37. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–21 (2012) [hereinafter, “CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF”] (as part of the governing principles of cyberspace); Julie E. Cohen,
Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 225–27 (2007) (users are constrained
by the built online environments around them); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 25–28 (1996) (as the foundation
of political philosophy).
38. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics
Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES
363–64 (Alessandro Acquisti, Stefanos Gritzalis, Costos Lambrinoudakis, & Sabrina di
Vimercati eds., 2008); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in
Individual Decision Making, 3 IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY 26 (2005).
39. Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John, & George Loewenstein, The Impact of
Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 160, 160 (2012).
40. Id. at 160, 165, 172.
41. Id. at 160, 171–72.
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manipulated: positive emotional feelings about a website,
professional website design, the type of information requested,
and the presence of a privacy policy correlate with a higher
willingness to disclose. 42 The law of notice-and-choice today
ignores such contextual factors. 43
Notice-and-choice is also hopelessly underinclusive. It reflects
an arbitrary and selective approach to the FIPPs, which also
included limitations on data collection, security requirements, a
rejection of black boxes, user rights to data, and robust
accountability policies. 44 Even in regulated sectors, current law
does not cover all data. For example, HIPAA only protects certain
health data held by certain covered entities, like health insurance
plans, clearinghouses, HMOs, and company health plans. And it
only applies to doctors if they electronically transfer information
in connection with a transaction for which the Department of
Health and Human Services has adopted a standard. 45 It is no
wonder that words like “patchwork” and “tangled web” are often
used to describe the current state of data privacy law in the United
States. 46 As Bamberger and Mulligan pointed out, many scholars
and advocates suggested that the best way to solve these problems
is to enact a comprehensive data privacy law and shift toward the
more robust data protection regulatory regime of the European
Union. 47
B. Chief Privacy Officers
One commentator recommending such a shift was H. Jeff
Smith, a management scholar who published a study of privacy
professionals in 1994. 48 In the seven U.S. companies he studied,
42. Han Li, Rathindra Sarathy, & Heng Xu, The Role of Affect and Cognition on
Online Consumers’ Decisions to Disclose Personal Information to Unfamiliar Online
Vendors, 51 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 434, 435 (2011).
43. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 236–37 (2010).
44. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA,
Part II (2001), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyand
transborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm.
45. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–160.103. See also Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/coveredentities/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
46. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carole M. Hayes & Masooda M. Bashir, A Comprehensive
Empirical Study of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267, 27–78
n.61 (2016); Priscilla M. Regan, Safe Harbors or Free Frontiers? Privacy and Transborder
Data Flows, 59 J. Soc. Issues 263, 275 (2003).
47. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 259–60.
48. H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE
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he found that few paid any attention to privacy and none dedicated
significant resources to privacy protocols. While some corporations
had no internal policies on privacy, others disregarded the ones
they had. Smith also found that privacy considerations were
noticeably absent in decisions about technology or business
development. Privacy was, at best, an afterthought, and at worst,
ignored completely. 49 Smith argued that these failures could be
traced back to the law’s “ambiguity” regarding what privacy meant
and how companies are supposed to comply. 50 Because privacy,
like corporate social responsibility, generally, can sometimes
conflict with more primary corporate goals, 51 Smith suggested that
a stronger, European-style regulatory approach was needed to
force companies to take privacy seriously. 52
But Bamberger and Mulligan noticed that even as U.S.
privacy laws on the books had retained their underinclusive
approach, a lot had changed on the ground since Smith’s bleak
narrative in 1994. An entire professional class of privacy
professionals, led by CPOs and organized into large professional
associations, had emerged. 53 Many of them were C-suite
executives, and they were being hired in all industries, from the
financial and health sectors to retail. 54 Law firms and many
corporations now had robust privacy law practices. Privacy seals
became sought after symbols of legitimacy. 55 And extensive audits
of corporate privacy practices were now part of the corporate
routine. 56 If these changes were not due to the Europeanization of
American privacy law, what caused this shift?
Bamberger and Mulligan asked the CPOs themselves.
Through a series of interviews with privacy professionals
recognized as leaders in their fields, 57 they found that rather than
AMERICA 15, 25, 50–51, 209 (1994).
49. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 249–50 (citing
SMITH, supra note 48, at 4, 82, 135–36, 139, 207, 213).
50. SMITH, supra note 48, at 139. See generally id. at Ch. 6.
51. See, e.g., Peter Arlow & Martin J. Gannon, Social Responsiveness, Corporate
Structure, and Economic Performance, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 235, 236 (1982).
52. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 250 (citing SMITH,
supra note 48, at 212–13, 217–18, 220).
53. Id. at 261–62.
54. Id. at 262.
55. Organizations such as TRUSTe issue privacy “seals” to websites that notify users
about “what information is gathered/tracked; [h]ow the information is used; [and] [w]ho
information is shared with.” Solove & Hartzog, supra note 3, at 593.
56. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 263.
57. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 11–12, 40–
43, 59 (on research methodology, including the focus on corporate executives and privacy
leads).
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having a corrosive effect on privacy on the ground, some ambiguity
in the law allowed privacy leads to innovate and fall back on their
creativity and judgment. 58 They found that CPOs understood
privacy to be more than just giving users notice 59 and saw their
companies’ responsibilities as more than just compliance. To the
CPOs, legal rules provided a floor. 60 And privacy was a constantly
evolving user-focused concept about which they had to think
proactively and strategically. Many of the interviewees felt that
corporate privacy strategy was about maintaining user trust and
being sufficiently flexible, adaptive, and forward-looking to meet
consumer expectations whatever they may be. 61 It was not about
doing the least they could to prevent a lawsuit. Rather, they had
to engage in ongoing management of risk and keep up with
consumers’ changing expectations. 62 Several CPOs talked about
their jobs in fiduciary terms: they were “steward[s]” of data and
“responsibl[e]” to consumers. 63 They saw their primary objective
as creating and maintaining “the company’s trusted relationship”
with customers, employees, and society. 64 In short, Bamberger and
Mulligan found a profession of privacy officers earnestly working
hard to advance the cause of consumer privacy within their
companies.
The CPOs saw three seminal developments that contributed
to their robust approaches to privacy: the emergence of the FTC as
a privacy regulator, the passage of state data breach notification
statutes, and the rise of strong advocates and media interested in
privacy. 65 The FTC stepped into the role of de facto privacy
regulator in the late 1990s pursuant to its authority in Section 5
of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.” 66 Its growing portfolio of
privacy actions has had a real effect on the ground: some of
58. Id. at 12.
59. Id. at 61. To many of them, notice was not even a helpful concept. When dealing
with ongoing use and analysis of data, notice as a legal requirement ceases to be relevant.
Id. at 63.
60. Id. at 60, 64.
61. Id. at 59, 65, 67. See also Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra
note 1, at 280.
62. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 67, 68.
63. Id. at 66.
64. Id. at 67.
65. Id. at 69–74.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful.”). The FTC was given the authority to prevent such practices in subsection (a)(2).
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
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Bamberger and Mulligan’s interviewees owed their jobs to FTC
enforcement actions against their employers. But more broadly,
the CPOs recognized that operationalizing privacy law meant
more than just looking at federal and state laws; they also had to
consider “FTC cases and best practices, including ‘all the
enforcement actions [and] what the FTC is saying.’” 67 And since
the FTC has been adept at enforcing consumers’ evolving privacy
expectations, especially as it has expanded its work from broken
promises litigation to a broad range of consumer privacy protection
cases, 68 CPOs implementing this new “common law of privacy”
followed suit. 69 Together with the political and media attention
that came with data breaches, 70 this incentivized companies to
take privacy seriously. An increasingly active, engaged, and
professional privacy community then helped newly placed CPOs
develop practices that would both respond to FTC requirements
and help ensure public trust. 71
Bamberger and Mulligan also came away with some
recommendations from their interviewees about how best to
operationalize robust privacy practices throughout a company.
The CPOs recognized two common threads: a powerful privacy
lead at the top, with access to executives and the board, and
distributed privacy responsibilities throughout a company’s
business units. 72 The most successful CPOs have the ear of the
chief executive, report directly to the Board, and are accorded
professional deference. They focus on developments in privacy in
the wider legal and consumer space and translate what they learn
into internal policies. 73
But to push privacy as a priority throughout a company, CPOs
need to involve “business-line executives” to develop specific
privacy practices for their units. This collaboration creates a
distributed network of accountability. A majority of the
interviewees told Bamberger and Mulligan that “senior executives
in the business units” had primary privacy responsibility. 74 Some
companies also embedded employees trained in privacy issues
throughout business units or employed unit-specific privacy

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 69.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 3, at 585–86, 590, 627–28, 649, 667, 672, 676.
Id. at 619–27.
BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 71–73.
Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77, 78, 80.
Id. at 83.
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leads. 75 Since they would always be closer to the action than the
CPO at the top, distributed privacy representatives could spot
issues early, respond to them, and integrate privacy into design. 76
III.

TWO PRIVACY NARRATIVES

Bamberger and Mulligan’s important and insightful research
suggests that empowered and innovative CPOs are creating and
operationalizing a robust, flexible, and user-focused conception of
privacy on the ground. They are heeding cues from the FTC, from
each other, and from users, and embedding privacy into the
products their companies create. As powerful as that narrative is,
it leaves two questions unanswered, both of which suggest that
Privacy on the Ground was a first step in a wider research agenda.
First, if the privacy leads that participated in Bamberger and
Mulligan’s research are approaching consumer privacy as
thoroughly as they describe, to what extent have they been
successful at integrating privacy throughout the culture of their
companies? Second, how are CPOs, business-line executives, and
unit-specific privacy leads “baking” privacy into design if none of
them actually design anything? 77 That is, Bamberger and
Mulligan revealed an important piece of the privacy by design
puzzle, but the engineers and other technologists actually
responsible for integrating corporate mandates into design must
also be part of this story. 78 In this section, I tell the privacy
narrative of some technology product designers. That story
75. Id. at 84–85.
76. Id. at 86.
77. Ann Cavoukian, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada,
has argued that privacy by design is “the philosophy and approach of embedding privacy
into the design specifications of various technologies.” ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN
1 (2009); see also ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES (2009).
78. This distinction reflects the two aspects to every corporation’s routine. In this
context, a “routine” refers to a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent actions,
carried out by multiple actors. Martha S. Feldman & Brian T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing
Organizational Routines as a Source of Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 94, 95–
96 (2003). Every organization deploys routines. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter F. Powell,
The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983). Adopting Bruno Latour’s
distinction between the “ostensive” and the “performative” aspects of behavior, Feldman
and Pentland argue that executives are responsible for the “ostensive” aspect of routines:
setting the tone for action, laying out a mission, and creating policies that form best practice
guides. Then, routines are “performed” by workers on the ground: real people doing real
work translating the mission into action, products, and widgets. Feldman & Pentland,
supra note 78, at 95, 101. See also Bruno Latour, The Powers of Association, 32 SOC. REV.
264, 266–68, 271–73 (1984). Understanding the diffusion of norms through the routine
requires studying both aspects, not just one.
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suggests that perhaps Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s narrative has
yet to be fully realized. From the user’s perspective, the CPO’s
trust-based and forward-looking vision of privacy seems to run
counter to both our experiences with technology products and
privacy notices. And from the perspective of some of the lawyers
and technologists in the trenches, it is not often part of the daily
practice of design. In short, the vision of privacy held by some
technologists and lawyers, particularly those in the high
technology sector, is less robust, more reactive, and less central to
their work than their CPO might hope.
A. Designing Without Privacy
As Woodrow Hartzog describes in his book, Privacy’s
Blueprint, many of our favorite technology products are designed
without our privacy in mind. 79 They may not always be willfully
and purposely designed to manipulate us or invade our privacy
(although some are). Many of them just ignore us and fail to take
account of our privacy needs and expectations. Either way, they
may reflect an institutional approach that has yet to fully realize
their CPO’s vision of privacy. There are countless examples. I will
touch on four here.
Snapchat sold itself as a privacy-protective platform. 80
Beloved by its core base of Millennial users in part because any
image or video, or “snap,” sent across it automatically disappears
after several seconds, the app theoretically offers powerful privacy
protections for its users. Except, it was not originally designed that
way. Before sending a snap, users were shown a screen that
required them to designate the amount of time the snap will
survive before disappearing. 81 Snaps could not be sent without
selecting an option. But, in fact, there were several ways snaps
sent could be saved, downloaded, or copied. 82 This gave users the
79. See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (forthcoming 2018). Selections of this forthcoming text were
presented at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference on June 3, 2016 at the George
Washington University Law School.
80. Snapchat is an image messaging and multimedia mobile app with more than 100
million active users and 400 million “snaps” (audio or video messages) sent every day. Jason
Abbruzzese, Report: Snapchat Valued at $10 Billion in Latest Investment, MASHABLE (Aug. 26,
2014), http://mashable.com/2014/08/26/snapchat-10-billion-valuation/#rVMZROnUy5qQ.
81. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 6.
82. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 9–17. Much of the FTC’s case against
Snapchat focused on the company’s failure to disclose certain data collection practices in its
privacy statement. See id. ¶¶ 8–33. But broken promises litigation is just one part of the
FTC’s privacy jurisprudence. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 3, at 667. As Solove &
Hartzog point out, the FTC has developed a broader view of unfair or deceptive practices,
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false impression, reinforced in the platform’s product descriptions
and Frequently Asked Questions, 83 that they actually had control
over what their recipients could do with their snaps.
Other aspects of Snapchat’s original design also reflected an
institutional approach that neglected privacy. Until October 2013,
it stored all videos in unprotected spaces on users’ phones, which
allowed recipients to simply search for and download a video they
wanted to save. 84 Snapchat also allowed any third-party
application to access its application programming interface and
download or copy videos and images. 85 Not only were these
vulnerabilities not conveyed to users, but the platform’s design
created contrary expectations.
More recently, the wildly popular Pokémon Go app was also
designed without privacy in mind. 86 In its initial release, the
platform accessed players’ smartphone cameras, collected location
data, and, most notably, gained full access to players’ Google
accounts, including email, calendars, photos, stored documents,
and any other data associated with the login. 87 The app was
designed this way. In order to play Pokémon Go, players need an
account. Accounts could be created in two ways: through
pokemon.com or through Google. Normally, when an app user
signs in using a Google account, a pop-up explains what data the
app will be able to access, allowing the user to decide to go ahead
or decline based on the app’s data use practices. 88 That was not
including, for example, “deception by omission,” id. at 631, “inducement” to share personal
information, id. at 632–33, and “pretexting,” id. at 633, to name just a few. Their persuasive
argument is that “through a common law-like process, the FTC’s actions have developed
into a rich jurisprudence that is effectively the law of the land for businesses that deal in
personal information.” Id. at 589.
83. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 7–8.
84. Id. ¶ 10.
85. Id. ¶ 11.
86. Pokémon Go is a location-based augmented reality game where players locate,
capture, and engage with virtual creatures called Pokémon who appear on screen as if they
were really in front of the player. See POKÉMON GO, http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemonvideo-games/pokemon-go/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
87. See Valerie Strauss, Pokémon Go Sparks Concern About Children’s Privacy,
WASH. POST (July 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/
2016/07/19/pokemon-go-sparks-concern-about-childrens-privacy/ (including a letter from
Common Sense Media Founder James Steyer detailing some of the app’s privacy
challenges).
88. These are called “just in time” notifications, and they are popular among privacy
regulators. The FTC recommends them: “Providing such a disclosure at the point in time
when it matters to consumers, just prior to the collection of such information by apps, will
allow users to make informed choices about whether to allow the collection of such
information.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST
THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 15–16 (Feb. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-
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the case with Pokémon Go. Rather, users signed in using Google
and immediately proceeded to the game interface. The default
permissions, which were hidden by design, gave Pokémon Go full
access to the player’s Google account. The app’s developers said
the broad permissions were “erroneous,” 89 but even if that were
true, Pokémon Go was still designed without privacy as a priority.
Uber went even further. Uber designed its app to give the
company the power to identify its users even after they had deleted
the program. The technique Uber used, known as fingerprinting,
leaves a small piece of code on a phone after deletion so the app
developer can know if the same device ever reinstalls the app. It
has non-invasive users: In Uber’s case, fingerprinting allowed the
company to crack down on drivers who were downloading the app
over and over again, creating new dummy accounts, and racking
up ride volume. But it also allowed the company to individually
identify specific users even after they had deleted the app. 90
Finally, although not an online platform like Snapchat or
Pokémon Go, privacy notices are also designed without users in
mind. Joel Reidenberg, Lorrie Cranor, and others have shown that
privacy policies are difficult to read and understand. They are
often written to be confusing, obscure, and inscrutable. 91 They are
also presented to users in ways that deter us from trying to read
them in the first place. 92 For the most part, privacy policies today
are presented in small type sizes, without sufficient spaces
between lines or necessary white spaces in the margins, without
federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf. There is also
evidence to suggest that just in time notifications work. See, e.g., Rebecca Balebako et al.,
“Little Brothers Watching You”: Raising Awareness of Data Leaks on Smartphones,
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security 2–3, 8, 10 (2013).
89. See Laura Hudson, How to Protect Privacy While Using Pokémon Go and Other
Apps, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/technology/
personaltech/how-to-protect-privacy-while-using-pokemon-go-and-other-apps.html?_r=0.
90. Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays With Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2pSAyyu.
91. See, e.g., R Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches
Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 39, 40, 87–88 (2015)
(presenting results of an experimental study showing that average internet users do not
understand privacy policies and that even experts cannot agree on the meanings of certain
terms). Cranor estimates that it would take a user an average of 244 hours per year to read
the privacy policy of every website she visited. See Cranor, supra note 11, at 274 (2012).
This translates to about fifty-four billion hours per year for every U.S. consumer to read all
the privacy policies he or she encountered. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor,
The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 563 (2008).
92. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 129,
164–74 (forthcoming 2018) (showing how website and mobile app privacy policies are
designed and presented to users in unpleasant ways that make it difficult for users to
interact with them).
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distinguishing headings or subheadings, and in colors that make
them difficult to see. 93 Privacy policies are written by lawyers, for
lawyers. Users are ignored.
Technologies like Snapchat, Pokémon Go, and the Uber app,
as well as most privacy notices today, do not reflect the vision of
privacy of the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s study. Rather,
our privacy was, at best, a secondary consideration in design. This
does not challenge the Bamberger and Mulligan narrative, but it
does question whether the vision of the CPOs they interviewed has
been fully realized throughout technology companies.
Undoubtedly, many privacy leads are hard at work encouraging
their employers to take user privacy seriously. I do not mean to
suggest otherwise. But there is another, parallel process at work.
While many corporate CPOs may be nudging their boards, raising
privacy issues in executive-level meetings, and collaboratively
creating privacy protocols with unit vice presidents, 94
technologists and lawyers are doing the work of privacy on the
ground, designing products and notices for user consumption. The
next section is based on qualitative research into how lawyers and
designers in the high technology sector incorporate privacy into
their work. It presents an account of a far narrower vision of
privacy that is factored into design, suggesting that more work
may need to be done to fully implement Bamberger and Mulligan’s
research.
B. Technologists and Lawyers Discuss Privacy
Over a 16-month period in 2016 and 2017, I conducted semistructured interviews with nearly 80 technologists, all of whom
are either current or former employees of technology companies of
varying sizes, from Google and Facebook to start-ups, or
technologists with product design experience at other companies,
from home goods to online retail. 95 This group included engineers,
computer scientists, programmers and coders, and web designers.
This Article is based on a subset of those interviews, reflecting
designers who work or have worked for high tech companies.
I identified these interviewees first via snowball sampling, a
93. Id. at 136–39 (describing, among other things, the results of an informal canvas
of 191 privacy policies from popular websites in a variety of industries, from media and
entertainment to retail, from sports to news).
94. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 76–86.
95. Though the interviews all began with questions about the interviewees’
background, education, and work responsibilities, the discussions rarely followed a set
script. That said, some of the questions I asked are attached at Appendix A (on file with
Author).
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non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects
recruit additional study subjects from among their friends,
acquaintances, and social networks. 96 It can help researchers with
limited resources identify target populations within a large,
diffuse community, 97 i.e., technology workers. Because
network-based sampling techniques like this tend to identify
individuals with particularly thick social networks—people who
know a lot of other people in the same field 98—the individuals
identified have a high likelihood of being well connected,
experienced, and knowledgeable in the research subject. Snowball
sampling also has downsides; it tends to identify research targets
that are similar to each other. Given that potential for bias, other
methodologies were used. I attended technology conferences and
approached random attendees, some of whom agreed to short
conversations. By the end of my ethnographic research in the
Summer of 2017, snowball sampling likely accounted for only onethird of the total interviewees.
I do not purport to argue that my sample is representative of
the entire designer community. 99 The interview responses cannot
be generalized to cover all technologists or all lawyers. That,
however, is not my goal. Like Bamberger and Mulligan, who used
snowball sampling to find insight into the behavior of leading
privacy professionals, 100 I hope to open a window into how some
technologists and lawyers factor privacy considerations into their
work and how, if at all, some corporate structure can embed
privacy norms into design. This research is intended to suggest
that the role of engineers and other designers and their privacy
narratives need to be studied further in the research agenda on
privacy by design. I do not suggest that all engineers or firm
lawyers think the same way.
The interviewees all earned technology-related degrees, like
computer science or engineering. The sample included no African
American technologists—an ongoing problem in the technology

96. See Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STAT.
148, 148–70 (1961); James S. Coleman, Relational Analysis: The Study of Social
Organizations with Survey Methods, 17 HUMAN ORG. 28, 28–29 (1958–1959).
97. Susan Welch, Sampling by Referral in a Dispersed Population, 39 PUB. OP. Q.
237, 237–38 (1975).
98. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973).
99. Snowball sampling also comes with certain biases. Because it relies on social
networks starting with the researcher and branching out from subject to subject, snowball
sampling can underrepresent isolated or unique individuals or over represent those with
similar characteristics to the original researcher. Welch, supra note 105, at 238.
100. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 1, at 264.

Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)

680

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

2/12/2018 12:12 AM

[55:3

community 101—but did include diversity on other identity-based
metrics, including ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. 102
I also interviewed 14 lawyers at private firms whose portfolios
included privacy and cyber security. I also reached out to attorneys
at AmLaw Top 100 firms who listed privacy as part of their
practices. These interviewees were particularly diverse along
gender lines: 9 of the 14 who agreed to speak with me were women.
They earned their degrees at a variety of law schools. All worked
for firms with more than 50 employees. 103
I offered every interviewee the opportunity to discuss their
views anonymously, pseudonymously, or with their real name and
affiliation. All interviewees except one preferred some level of
anonymity, either because they could not honestly respond
without obscuring their identities or because they were in the
process of or planning to apply for jobs in the technology sector.
Therefore, I worked with each of them to find a descriptor that
made them comfortable. All consented to some mention of the type
of company they worked for—“a coder at a large technology
company,” for example. Lawyers chose this option, as well, opting
to be identified only as “a partner at an AmLaw Top 100 law firm,”
or something similar. Pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, I
respected all of these preferences in order to engage in honest
discussions about their privacy-related work.
Many of the interviewees described similar views on privacy
and alluded to personal and educational biases and corporate
barriers that, as discussed in more detail in Part IV, could hinder
the institutionalization of robust privacy norms from the CPO’s
office. Other interviews revealed ways in which privacy can factor
101. See, e.g., Mark Milian, The Silicon Valley Diversity Numbers No One is Proud Of,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2014, 11:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-12/thesilicon-valley-diversity-numbers-nobody-is-proud-of.html; Vauhini Vara, Why Doesn’t Silicon
Valley Hire Black Coders?: Howard University Fights to Join the Tech Boom, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-howard-university-coders/.
102. I was able to include gender, sexual orientation, and gender expression diversity
in the sample of technologists through my participation in Out in Tech, a nonprofit that
provide resources and mentorship to ensure career access for LGBTQ individuals interested
in technology industries. Several of the interviewees in this study responded to a request
for participation sent through the organization’s mailing list. They helped connect me with
other technologists, as well. Who We Are, OUT IN TECH, https://outintech.com/about/ (last
visited Jan. 10, 2018).
103. This Article does not reflect interviews with in-house attorneys, although my
ongoing research since has. My rationales for excluding in-house lawyers from this stage of
the research project are as follows. First, Bamberger and Mulligan included the perspective
of some in-house lawyers in their research. Second, the goal of this project was to reach to the
very front lines of privacy work. That includes the products we use and the interfaces we see.
Both of them are created by designers and technologists. And outside lawyers draft the privacy
policies that form the legal relationship between technology platforms and their users.
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into design and highlighted structural changes that make privacy
more likely to be a priority in other companies. 104 But, for the most
part, technologists and firm lawyers thought about privacy in
narrow ways, either as synonymous with encryption or limited to
notice-and-choice. Many engineers found user privacy difficult to
integrate into design, and many thought it was beyond the scope
of their employment mandates. Corporate privacy structures,
especially those set up as independent departments, tended to
take laissez faire approaches to consumer privacy. Therefore,
privacy decisions were made on the fly by engineers and engineeronly teams, while privacy took on a compliance, check-the-box
approach.
1. The Meaning of “Privacy”.
When Bamberger and
Mulligan spoke to CPOs at leading multinational corporations,
they found a vision of privacy far more robust than the
autonomy-based conception of privacy embedded in the law on the
books. 105 The CPOs recognized that privacy was not just about
notice, control, or compliance. Rather “customer or . . . individual
expectations” governed the corporate approach to privacy. The
interviewees most frequently couched their understanding of
privacy in fiduciary terms: privacy was about “respect[ing]” their
customers, being “steward[s]” of their data, and “protect[ing]” the
information they collected. Notably, the CPOs felt that privacy
“equated to trust” or was a “core value associated with trust.”106
To the extent that the technologists I interviewed had an
understanding of privacy as a substantive concept—and many of
them did not—it was fundamentally different from that of the
CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s work. Several current and
former engineers at major technology companies said that “privacy
was not a helpful concept.” 107 One was particularly incredulous:
“What does the word ‘privacy’ mean? I don’t know.” 108 A former
104. It is worth noting what I mean by “factoring privacy into design” or “taking
privacy seriously in design” or “integrating privacy protections into the design of new
technologies,” phrases that I use throughout this Article. This project is primarily
concerned with the design process and how, if at all, privacy issues are raised and solved at
the design stage. It is true that design teams can consider privacy issues, but for whatever
reason, do not code in a fix to the privacy problem. Although that is better than ignoring
privacy wholesale, I am still concerned with the cultural, legal, structural, and social forces,
if any, that prevented a privacy fix from making it into the final product design.
105. See supra Part II.A.
106. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 270–71.
107. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company (4) (Aug.
18, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
108. Telephone interview with engineer at fitness technology company (Sept. 16, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
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engineer at LinkedIn agreed: “We all think about privacy, but I
don’t think anyone has a clear idea of what it means.” 109
These responses could reflect the fact, noted often in privacy
scholarship, 110 that privacy is an ambiguous concept hard to pin
down. Or it could be based on the lack of any privacy-specific
education in many major technology degree programs. 111 But
many technologists did have a conception of privacy. I noticed two
running themes during the interviews: privacy-as-notice-andchoice and the conflation of privacy and security. Some,
particularly programmers or engineers who had been promoted to
team leader or product manager positions, thought that privacy
was about “giving users notice about what was happening with
their data.” A former product manager at Google now running his
own start up agreed: “Privacy is definitely important. We have to
give users the information they need to make decisions.” 112 When
an engineering team leader at a New York technology company
responded similarly, he added, “or else how can you decide if you
want to use my app or some Silicon Valley copy?” 113 A senior
engineer who used to work for Uber said that “we have to make
sure you know what’s going on. I think that’s what we think about
when privacy comes up: your ability to make the right decisions
[about information] for you.” 114
Perhaps the best reflections of the technologists’
understanding of privacy were two responses on the issue of
behavioral targeting, or the process by which advertisers track
Internet users’ online activities and use that information to
identify what kinds of ads they want to see. 115 A former
technologist at Facebook raised the issue on his own: “Look at ad
109. LinkedIn engineer interview, supra note 15.
110. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2009) (“Privacy,
however, is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means. Currently, privacy
is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over
one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over personal information, freedom from
surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and
interrogations.”); Waldman, supra note 18, at 565–88 (reviewing the literature on different
conceptions of privacy).
111. See infra Part IV.D.
112. Telephone interview with start-up CEO (Sept. 19, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
113. Interview with engineer in New York (Sept. 23, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
114. Interview with senior engineer at Uber (Sept. 23, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
115. Behavioral targeting is “the tracking of a consumer’s activities online . . . in order to
deliver advertising targeted to the individual consumer’s interests.” FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELFREGULATORY PRINCIPLES 2 (2007) [hereinafter, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/online-behavioraladvertising-moving-discussion-forward-possible-self-regulatory-principles/p859900stmt.pdf.
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targeting. People love it. Someone living in Southern Kentucky
doesn’t want to see an ad for some artisanal cheese place in SoMa
[the South of Market neighborhood in San Francisco]. Privacy to
me means giving people the choice to get the best ads possible or
to see things irrelevant to their lives.” 116 Despite the privacy risks
inherent in behavioral targeting, 117 this technologist saw privacy
as much more limited, as the seemingly easy choice between
opting in and opting out. A former engineer at Google and
Microsoft referred to this as a “dogma” that most engineers
“actually believe.” 118 Under such a dogma, consumer privacy must
be relatively narrow: it misses the privacy concerns associated
with data tracking and is, therefore, limited to notice-and-choice.
Notably, this definition of privacy was shared by almost every
lawyer I interviewed. A partner at an AmLaw Top 100 law firm
saw privacy “as the notion that you should have some control over
your data.” 119 Her colleague followed up: “Exactly. Privacy is about
companies giving you the tools you need to control dissemination
of your data. We can help our clients do that by clearly and
adequately laying out data use practices.” 120 A senior associate at
a small law firm specializing in internet and privacy matters
agreed, stating that “privacy is about giving internet users notice
about what will happen to their data. This allows them to go to
another website if they want to.” An experienced partner at a New
York law firm thought the question was straightforward: “Privacy
is whatever the law says it is.” Though I found that response
unsatisfying, this partner disagreed. “We spend a lot of time
reviewing statutes, FTC actions, and anything we can get our
hands on. The law is clear. Our clients have to provide users with
notice and choice. It’s repeated over and over. And we help them
do that.” 121
Another theme running through the interviews with
technologists was the association of privacy with encryption. Nine
technologists stated it explicitly; several others used words or

116. Telephone interview with former technologist at Facebook (June 4, 2016) (notes
on file with Author).
117. See, e.g., ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 115, at 2–6.
118. Telephone interview with former engineer at Google and Microsoft (Oct. 4, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
119. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (11) (Sept. 30,
2016) (notes on file with Author).
120. Telephone interview with associate at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (Sept. 30, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
121. Interview with senior partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm, in New York, NY, (Sept.
23, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
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phrases like “de-identify” 122 or “add noise” 123 or “security,” 124 and
one said that privacy was about “making data impossible to
hack.” 125 A programmer at a publishing company said that he “was
taught that part of my job was going to be to encrypt the data we
collected.” Another engineer stated plainly that many of his
colleagues believed that “if I encrypt the data, it’s private.” 126 The
Linked In engineer stated: “My job was to prevent us from getting
hacked.” 127 An app developer said that his job was to “tell my
engineers, my programmers, my data guys that the shit would hit
the fan if we ever got hacked. Security had to be an important
priority. Sure, we all need to make money and we all want to make
money. But we’re not going to do that if we don’t secure the
data.” 128
These two themes—privacy-as-notice and privacy-assecurity—are different from the motifs that came through
Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s interviews. Trust, though a
watchword among scholars and CPOs, only came up in terms of
providing users with notice. The latter group, which consistently
defined a “company” definition of privacy as consistent with user
expectations and evolving notions of responsibility and trust, 129
wanted their organizations to go beyond notice, choice, and
security. Indeed, several of Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s
interviewees felt that discussions about “security,” “notice,” and
“consent,” 130 the outer limits of the firm lawyers’ and technologists’
understanding of privacy, played “limited role[s]” in the ways their
companies approached privacy questions, 131 especially when it
came to the ongoing use and manipulation of collected data. 132 This
divergence suggests that the CPO’s vision of privacy has not yet
been fully realized among the lawyers and technologists doing the
122. Interview with member of trust and security team at Bloomberg LP, in New York,
NY (Oct. 17, 2016) (notes on file with Author). De-identification is a common security and
encryption tool. It does not always work. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1701, 1716–31
(2010) (discussing the failure of anonymization and the implications for privacy law).
123. Silicon Valley engineer (4) interview, supra note 107.
124. Telephone interview with former engineer at Google and Microsoft (Oct. 4, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
125. Interview with member of trust and security team at Bloomberg LP, supra note 122.
126. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124.
127. LinkedIn engineer interview, supra note 15.
128. Telephone interview with app developer (Aug. 19, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
129. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 270.
130. Id. at 266–67.
131. Id. at 266.
132. Id. at 267.

Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)

2018]

DESIGNING WITHOUT PRIVACY

2/12/2018 12:12 AM

685

work of privacy on the ground. The ways, if any, in which these
understandings of privacy impacted the design process is the
subject of the next section.
2. Privacy and the Design Process. The CPOs interviewed in
Privacy on the Ground earnestly wanted to include their concern
for privacy into the design process. They created robust and
integrated policies to do so. They embedded privacy personnel into
different business units or geographic centers to “position[ ]
privacy as a design requirement.” 133 In addition, the CPOs worked
with unit vice presidents and others trained in privacy issues to
“identify items for consideration” and develop “appropriate
business-level policies.” 134 Some companies went further, creating
privacy “checkpoints” and “privacy impact assessment” tools that
included questions to ask and answer during the design process to
elevate privacy on the priority ladder. 135
These are excellent ideas that could, theoretically, help embed
privacy norms throughout a company. 136 However, at least at
many of the companies represented in my interviews with
technologists, these policies and tools either existed, but were
never used, or did not exist at all. The integration of privacy issues
into technologists’ work was often limited to the onboarding
process. Privacy professionals or other personnel trained in
privacy rarely met with engineers and programmers, even during
weeks of intense design work. At companies that created privacy
teams that were supposed to “insinuate” themselves into design, 137
high turnover, a laissez-faire attitude, and corporate silos kept
privacy mostly orthogonal to design. And where privacy concerns
were flagged, decisions were made on the fly by engineers with no
privacy training. 138
Engineers working at start-ups “didn’t really think about

133. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 85–86.
134. Id. at 84–86.
135. Id. at 86.
136. However, they reflect a rather superficial understanding of the weaknesses of
organizational routines. As discussed in more detail in Part IV.C, structural changes to
corporate organization can help diffuse and embed robust privacy norms if they focus on
increasing organizational learning and rely on interpersonal trust.
137. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 85–86.
138. When responding to questions about corporate privacy and integrating privacy
into design, many technologists were particularly concerned about their anonymity. Several
respondents noted the high level of turnover at many technology companies and the
possibility that they could return to their former employers. As such, these technologists
requested that when it came to talking about company policies, that they not be identified
at all. All interviews, with appropriate redactions are on file with the Author.
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privacy.” Nor did the executives, for that matter. 139 Larger
companies that say they take privacy seriously had a different
problem: prioritization. Privacy was simply not a top priority for
engineers because it was crowded out by other mandates.
Engineers and start-up executives repeatedly spoke of the need to
collect data to optimize user experience: “we looked at data to see
what people are interested in, what they’re clicking on, and where
they’re going so we can make the site better. When we had some
privacy issue come up, it was added to the engineering queue. But
engineers had to prioritize speed, agility, functionality.” 140 A
computer programmer with experience at start-ups and at larger
companies noted that “we would work nonstop. I had a thousand
things to do, and this (privacy) was one of them. It wasn’t essential
to our success, so it didn’t get done.” 141
Many more established companies that are supposed to have
policies to ensure customer privacy factored into design work did
not always implement them: “does asking [a] question mean there
were policies?” 142 Sarcasm aside, many engineers were simply not
aware of checklists or assessments to help them integrate privacy
concerns into their work. The response from an engineer formerly
at a sharing economy company represented the views of a plurality
of the interviewees:
[Such policies] would have been great. That really could have
helped us avoid some problems and think more globally or
holistically about our work. But I can tell you that nothing
like that ever existed. If it did, I have to imagine I would have
heard about it. But I never did, and no one ever stopped me
and said, ‘here, use these.’ 143
That said, eleven interviewees recalled that privacy was
discussed, but only during onboarding. “I remember being told at
some point that we should think about privacy issues, but I think
that was limited to the first week,” 144 one said. A web designer
said that she “was told to think about privacy during a five-minute
talk during onboarding. I don’t think the word, or anything like it,
139. Interview with former general counsel at New York technology company, New
York, NY (Oct. 28, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
140. Id.
141. Interview with former programmer at New York start-up, New York, NY (June
24, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
142. Telephone interview with former computer programmer at online retailer (June
18, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
143. Telephone interview with engineer at large sharing economy company (Sept. 22,
2016) (notes on file with Author).
144. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company 2 (Sept.
9, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
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was ever mentioned again.” 145 Another “watched a 5-minute video
about handling sensitive information;” 146 yet another recalled that
her entire privacy orientation boiled down to “a warning: don’t
carelessly leave sensitive stuff at the gym, even in our gym.” 147
Other interviewees reported similar problems at other companies.
Interviewees used words and phrases like “hands off,” “absent,”
“uninvolved,” and “not really a factor,” to describe their employers’
approach to privacy. And, according to media reports, privacy is
not even part of Facebook’s famous bi-monthly “bootcamp” for new
engineers. 148
Interviewing several former designers at Google offered a
deeper picture of the company’s approach to privacy from 2010 to
2016. In reaction to several privacy failures, Google created a
privacy team in 2010, 149 and the company has routinely pointed to
the team’s large footprint as evidence of its commitment to user
privacy. 150 But according to several interviewees, privacy at
Google was much more oriented toward compliance and security
than a robust, user-focused vision of privacy in design.
Google says that it has a privacy infrastructure that appears
similar to a variant described by Bamberger and Mulligan
described in Privacy on the Ground. Their interviews with CPOs
revealed that some companies try to embed privacy norms with
“full-time privacy subject-matter experts” that help business units
with privacy issues in real time. 151 Google does that through a
privacy team, which, until recently, was run by Alma Whitten,
who earned a doctorate in computer science from Carnegie
Mellon. 152 It is now run by another security-focused technologist,
145. Interview with web designer, (Oct. 9, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
146. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124.
147. Telephone interview with computer programmer (June 27, 2016) (notes on file
with Author).
148. See J. O’Dell, Bootcamp! How Facebook Indoctrinates Every New Engineer It
Hires, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 2, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/03/02/
facebook-bootcamp/.
149. Google’s privacy infrastructure was created as part of a $22.5 million settlement with
the FTC for breaking various privacy promises. See Decision and Order, In the Matter of
Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 0923184, Docket No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf;
Press
Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It
Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9,
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-millionsettle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.
150. See Glenn Chapman, New Google Security Chief Looks for Balance with Privacy,
PHYS.ORG (Apr. 18, 2015), http://phys.org/news/2015-04-google-chief-privacy.html (“We
have made a tremendous effort to focus and double-down on privacy issues.”).
151. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 85.
152. See Frederic Lardinois, Google’s Director of Privacy Alma Whitten Steps Down,
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Lawrence You, an experienced Google hand with a doctorate in
computer science from the University of California at Santa Cruz
and an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering from
Stanford. 153 Both technologists became privacy leads from a cyber
security background, which makes sense given that some
technologists conflate privacy and security. 154
Several former Google employees interviewed noted that the
team was almost entirely focused on security and generally
isolated from any engineering work and product design. For
example, a job posting for an engineer for Google’s privacy “red
team” conflated privacy and security:
As a Data Privacy Engineer at Google you will help ensure
that our products are designed to the highest standards and
are operated in a manner that protects the privacy of our
users. Specifically, you will work as member of our Privacy
Red Team to independently identify, research, and help
resolve potential privacy risks across all of our products,
services, and business processes in place today. 155
One interviewee said that these jobs were akin to “penetration
testing, which is like hiring a hacker to test your security.” 156
Beyond developing cyber security structures, Google’s privacy
team often operated like a separate corporate department that had
to clear products at the end of the design process even though
privacy representatives were supposed to be integrated into design
teams. As one former engineer put it, “we would need to run our
design by privacy, legal, and marketing.” 157 But three factors
prevented that process from having any real impact on consumer
privacy in design. First, the team was entirely “focused on
security. They wanted to know if what I did could be hacked. And
I told them no.” Second, the process was “compliance-style. I
remember being told by my manager that ‘privacy checked the
boxes, so we can go ahead.’” 158 And third, there was a sense among
three interviewees that even though the privacy team, like the
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 1, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/04/01/googles-director-ofprivacy-alma-whitten-steps-down/.
153. See Lawrence You, Google+ Profile, https://plus.google.com/115317725503531115879
(last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
154. See supra notes 122–128 and accompanying text.
155. See Thomas Claburn, Google ‘Red Team’ To Test Product Privacy,
INFORMATIONWEEK: DARKREADING (Aug. 23, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/
risk-management/google-red-team-to-test-product-privacy/d/d-id/1105950?.
156. Telephone interview with former Google employee (Apr. 18, 2016) (notes on file
with Author).
157. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124.
158. Google employee interview, supra note 156.
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legal and marketing departments, were seen as hindrances to
design, the team did not really want to get in the way. “Nobody at
Google wants to stop creativity,” one former engineer said. 159 “I
can’t say for sure, but I’m sure privacy didn’t want to, either. They
didn’t stop us from doing our work.” 160 This narrow, compliance
focus from a team that, some suggested, wanted to get out of the
way of the design process, is quite different from the more robust,
deeply embedded vision that emerged from Bamberger and
Mulligan’s interviews. More specifically, it appears that the
structures the CPOs tried to put in place were insufficient.
Given the breakdown in operationalizing privacy through
dedicated corporate structure, either because such structures did
not exist or because of their narrow focus on security, privacy
decision-making fell to the engineers themselves. Any “decision we
ever had to make about privacy, when it did come up, was made
according to our best intuition,” one engineer noted. 161 And these
engineers rarely, if ever, could turn to a privacy expert or even a
lawyer for advice. Rather, as many technologists reported in their
interviews, they do their work in teams, many of which included
only other designers, an artist and, perhaps, a business-oriented
liaison. The team leader was also a coder; his—and they are almost
all men 162—supervisor was also a coder, promoted because he was
particularly good at his job, not because he had any leadership
skills or strategic planning perspective. Plus, many engineers
repeatedly noted the high degree of turnover within their teams. 163
In this environment, privacy decisions were made ad hoc, without
any clear guidance, and by technologists not necessarily in the best
position to make them.
3. The Role of the User. Users played an outsized role in the
narrative teased out by Bamberger and Mulligan. To the CPOs
interviewed, the user was at the center of their flexible and
adaptive approach to privacy. The model let “customer
or . . . individual expectations” guide corporate behavior above and
beyond the limited requirements of the law of notice-and-choice. 164
159. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124.
160. Google employee interview, supra note 156.
161. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company (6)
(June 20, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
162. See e.g., Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligenceswhite-guy-problem.html (discussing the existence and effects of implicit bias in future
technology design given that most technology designers are white men).
163. Interview with Silicon Valley engineer (6), supra note 161.
164. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 270.
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As noted above, CPOs saw themselves as “steward[s]” of their
customers’ data, and focused their work on earning and
maintaining user trust: “[T]he end objective,” one CPO reported,
“is always what’s the right thing to do to maintain the company’s
trusted relationship with our employees, with our clients, with any
constituency in society that has a relationship to us.” 165
This fiduciary, trust-based approach to privacy is the gold
standard for users. If implemented, it would change users’
traditionally limited role in the design of new technologies, from
one in which users rarely factor into and yet are constrained by
design 166 to one in which users become part of the design
process. 167 However, as my interviews revealed, how real people
use the products that technologists create is less important than
legal or professional mandates that govern design. 168
Fifteen of the designers I interviewed noted it was difficult in
practice to consider user needs. As one engineer noted, “there was
always an idea that we were designing for customers, many of
them loyal to [the company], but it’s difficult to consider that in
any practical way as I was actually doing my work.” 169 An
experienced engineer who became a senior product manager in
Silicon Valley summed up six interviewees’ thoughts on how users
factored into their work: “[The company] really cared about
customers trusting us. But that wasn’t my job. My job was to make
unhackable infrastructure, to design a platform that worked and
165. Id. at 271.
166. See Woolgar, supra note 16 (ethnographic study of a company developing one of the
first microcomputers showing that structural forces at play prevented users from truly being
considered in design). See also LUCY A. SUCHMAN, HUMAN-MACHINE RECONFIGURATION 186–
93, 257–84 (2d ed. 2007) (users configured by design); Cohen, supra note 38, at 210, 221, 225,
233–36 (the design of built online environments constrains user behavior).
167. As several sociologists have argued, users can be part of the social construction of
new technologies. See, e.g., Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, Users as Agents of Technological
Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States, 37 TECH. &
CUL. 763, 768–94 (1996) (cars); CLAUDE S. FISHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
THE TELEPHONE TO 1940 82 (1992) (telephone). But in these narratives, users factor into the
post-design social process by which inventions situate themselves into society. Integrating
robust privacy norms into the companies that create new technologies would ensure that users
and user needs are considered every step of the way during the design process.
168. The notion that technology and related law and policy should consider the
embodied experience of real users was raised, most notably, by Larry Lessig, Julie Cohen,
and others. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 24–29
(1999) (the design of the digital technologies that make up “cyberspace” make it impossible
for it to be a completely free space); CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF supra note 37, at
24–31 (2012). See also MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, xi
(Ted Honderich ed., Colin Smith trans. 1962).
169. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company (2)
(June 24, 2016) (notes on file with Author)
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worked well.” 170 Some technologists went further. One said:
“There is no possible way I could factor users into design. How
would that even be possible? There is no single user.” 171 Four
interviewees voiced the same problem. Their response was to
“design for the only person I know: myself” or to “design based on
the higher ups’ message.” 172
There was another recurring theme: in seven interviews,
technologists recalled that the concepts of the user and user trust
did come up, but most often with respect to the company’s bottom
line. The former Google and Microsoft engineer said it best. After
recalling the 2010 Chinese hack of Google servers173 and the 2011
FTC action against Google for misleading customers about the
privacy implications of Google Buzz, 174 it became clear that “Google
was concerned about users, but only as it affected the bottom line.”
He continued:
We were told, ‘Don’t let [the China hack or the Google Buzz
action] happen again.’ The company’s perspective was: we want
to protect our customers so they feel comfortable sharing their
data so we can still sell them adds. If Google has a major breach,
Google is done.175
This perspective seems in line with many companies’ and
technologists’ focus on security as the sum total of their privacy
priorities. But it reduces the impact users can have on the design
process.
Users factored only nominally into the privacy work of lawyers
at private firms, as well. In the last ten years, at least 90 of the
AmLaw Top 100 law firms have created privacy and security
practices. 176 Their attorneys’ work is varied, ranging from complex
170. Telephone interview with senior product manager (Oct. 4, 2016) (notes on file
with Author).
171. This problem was echoed by several of the engineers interviewed by Steve
Woolgar for Configuring the User. See Woolgar, supra note 16.
172. Telephone interview with game platform designer (Aug. 15, 2016) (notes on file
with Author).
173. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hackers Who Breached Google Gained Access
to Sensitive Data, U.S. Officials Say, WASH. POST (May 20, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-who-breachedgoogle-gained-access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say/2013/05/20/51330428-be34-11e289c9-3be8095fe767_story.html.
174. Complaint, In the Matter of Google, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 102 3136, Docket No. C4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf.
175. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124.
176. Ninety of the AmLaw Top 100 law firms included specific reference to their firm’s
privacy practices, alternatively called “Privacy and Cybersecurity,” “Security and Privacy,”
“Data Security,” or some variation. Because attorneys at the few top law firms that did not
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litigation to ongoing risk counseling. They also draft and update their
clients’ privacy policies, which, ostensibly, are supposed to give users
notice of platforms’ data use practices. 177 Most attorneys follow the
same procedure when updating privacy policies: after researching
relevant federal and state laws, FTC settlements, and any other
applicable guidance, they meet with in-house counsel and discuss
data use practices in more detail. Few would speak to their clients’
engineering team leaders to learn precisely how the company uses
customer data; most rely on in-house counsel or the company’s chief
technology officer to obtain the information for them. They would
then take this information and determine if updates to privacy
notices were necessary. Although some might argue that in-house
counsel is supposed to play this intermediary role, their involvement
in the process creates friction between engineers and privacy policies
that can end up weakening notice.
Although all attorneys interviewed recognized that privacy
policies “provided notice to users” and some encouraged their clients
to keep policies “short” and “comprehensible,” 178 the vast majority of
their work focused on privacy policy content. Most of the attorneys
were not concerned that privacy policies have become long, legalese
documents that users cannot understand. 179 As one attorney told me
directly: privacy policies “are legal documents and we treat them as
such.” 180 Another admitted that she “write[s] privacy policies for the
FTC. They are the only people who read them.”181 When probed
further, the head of a top law firm’s privacy practice stated that
“users know exactly where they are. If they wanted to read privacy
policies, they know where to find them. But they don’t. The FTC does,
and they are the ones who determine if our clients are at risk.”182
This last point reflected a common theme in most of the
attorneys’ responses. They saw their job as primarily “protect[ing]
clients from litigation” from the FTC and state attorneys general.
User expectations were absent. As one attorney with ten years’
differentiate a privacy-specific practice may still work on privacy issues on a more informal
basis, it is more accurate to say “at least 90” rather than 90.
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. Telephone interview with partner at 5-person privacy/internet boutique law firm
(Mar. 26, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
179. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 91, at 72 (presenting results of experiment
showing average internet users do not understand privacy policies).
180. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (1) (Sept. 16, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
181. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (2) (July 8, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
182. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (4) (July 15, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
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experience as outside privacy counsel noted, “When it comes to
privacy policies, we look to the law and we make sure we disclose
everything we need do.” Like their narrow, notice-based conception
of privacy, 183 firm attorneys’ take on their limited responsibilities
with respect to privacy policies contrasts with the robust “company
law” created by the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground. In the latter,
privacy leads not only found the law on the books unhelpful, they
went far beyond the letter of the law to develop robust privacy
structures throughout their companies. 184 Outside counsel, however,
relied almost exclusively on the law on the books to inform their
work. The kind of creativity displayed by the CPOs interviewed by
Bamberger and Mulligan was absent.
4. Technologists, Lawyers, and Privacy Professionals. The
CPOs Bamberger and Mulligan interviewed alluded to extensive
interaction down the corporate hierarchy between full- or part-time
privacy professionals and other decision-making employees. CPOs
and their direct subordinates would often work with business-line
executives, in-house counsel, risk management teams and other
functional groups to both internal privacy infrastructures. This
teamwork was important, the CPOs agreed, because privacy needed
a “buy-in” from key stakeholders across the company. 185 Some of
these companies also embedded privacy professionals within
business units, with each having subject matter and privacy
expertise, so they could interact with the businesses more directly
and provide decision-making guidance and training on the ground. 186
Therefore, some CPOs deployed privacy officers across departments,
from marketing and sales to finance and operations, that reported
directly to their unit executives and to the CPO.187 The interviewees
agreed that this diffuse structure was critical to “positioning privacy
as a design requirement rather than a legal matter.”188
Ostensibly, the goal of this embedded network of privacy
employees is to keep privacy decision-making as close as possible to
the trenches of day-to-day work. That requires ongoing interaction
and cooperation among privacy professionals and business unit
workers. At least with respect to the designers I interviewed,
however, that cooperation did not always exist. Several engineers
recalled “never once” meeting with “a privacy person the entire time
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text.
BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
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[they were] there.” 189 Another acknowledged that “there was a person
or a team who was supposed to be our privacy and security contact,
but I never heard from him.”190 A senior technologist in Silicon Valley
recalled that he “made all the decisions when they came up. I’m sure
there was someone, on paper, that I was supposed to talk to, but no
one ever said anything, no one made a push for it, and it just never
came up.” 191 Lawyers, too, were alien to technologists. “If you hadn’t
mentioned that there were lawyers there, or if I didn’t know
independently, I could easily assume that [the company] employed
zero attorneys,” said one engineer. 192 Outside counsel, one
interviewee noted flatly, “doesn’t have the ability to [talk to]
engineers.” 193 This lack of interaction is not necessarily a meaningful
thing; one interviewee suggested that “having to take a meeting with
a lawyer was a bad thing because it probably meant you did
something wrong.” 194
But the interviews suggested that the lack of interaction
between the technology teams, on the one hand, and everyone else,
on the other, was a pattern. As noted above, many technologists at
these companies work in teams that consist primarily of other
engineers. The teams are also run by engineers, and the tech lead’s
supervisor is also an engineer. “It was very easy,” one former
employee at Facebook noted, “for me to go an entire year without
talking to anyone who wasn’t also an engineer or computer
programmer.” 195 A product manager who started as a coder for a
large technology company said that although “I didn’t realize this
when I started, but I’ve found it to be true and was probably true of
me: programmers don’t want to be bothered by other people at their
job.” 196 An engineer who has been through several job transitions in
Silicon Valley and elsewhere also noted that independence is part of
how these jobs are marketed to computer science graduates. As she
explained, “They will give you money, food, and ping pong tables, you
know what I mean, but the most important thing, at least to me, they
tell you is that you will be independent. You will have time to be
189. Silicon Valley engineer (4) interview, supra note 107.
190. Interview with former programmer at New York start-up, New York, NY (June
24, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
191. Telephone interview with senior Silicon Valley engineer (Oct. 8, 2016) (notes on
file with Author).
192. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124.
193. Former general counsel at New York technology company interview, supra note 139.
194. Interview with web designer, supra note 145.
195. Telephone interview with former Facebook employee (Oct. 12, 2016) (notes on file
with Author).
196. Telephone interview with former coder at large technology company (Sept. 12,
2016) (notes on file with Author).
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creative, and you will solve these awesome engineering problems,
and we’re not going to get in your way.” 197 This resonates with what
we know about leading technology companies like Google. The
company is famous for a nonhierarchical structure, 198 independent
engineering teams, and the so-called “Google 20% time,” or the
promise that technologists can set aside 20% of their time to work on
their own creative projects. 199 It makes sense, then, that
technologists might just not interact with lawyers and privacy
professionals, but also remain separated from other types of
employees, as well.
This lack of interaction has effects on the design process. During
my talks with attorneys, many of them ably recognized even subtle
privacy issues associated with new technologies, particularly their
retail clients’ strategy to link loyalty programs with facial and
biometric tracking. But when asked how they advise their clients
about their privacy obligations, they took a passive role. “Unless
someone raises the issue to me, there’s nothing I can do,” noted a
partner with several years of privacy counseling experience. 200
In-house lawyers who are naturally closer to the design process than
outside counsel admitted this, as well. “We would let them come to
us,” several attorneys employed by technology companies said.
Although the attorney’s “door was always open, and I’m there to
help,” many in-house attorneys tasked with advising design teams
waited for the designers themselves to take the first step.201 But if
the technologists are not equipped to do so, then privacy issues never
get to a privacy professional’s desk. Another attorney stated, “It’s not
my job to challenge the design process. My job is to make sure what
they tell me they’re doing is compliant with the law.” And outside
197. Telephone interview with former engineer at Silicon Valley technology company
(1) (May 30, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
198. See, e.g., DOUGLAS EDWARDS, I’M FEELING LUCKY: THE CONFESSIONS OF GOOGLE
EMPLOYEE NUMBER 59, 224–27 (2011) (discussing the early years of Google including a
now-famous firing of all project managers in 2001); STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW
GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 158–60 (2011) (covering the origins of the
nonhierarchical structure and its effects on creativity and innovation).
199. See LASZLO BOCK, WORK RULES!: INSIGHTS FROM INSIDE GOOGLE THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW YOU LIVE AND LEAD 135–36 (2015). Notably, the “20 percent time” may
be mostly imaginary. But, as Bock explains in his book, the “idea” of the 20 percent time is
more important than its actual existence or use. “It operates somewhat outside the lines of
formal management oversight, and always will, because the most talented and creative
people can’t be forced to work.” Id. at 136. See also Nicholas Carlson, The ‘Dirty Little Secret’
About Google’s 20% Time, According To Marissa Mayer, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/mayer-google-20-time-does-not-exist-2015-1.
200. Interview with senior associate at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (2) (July 29, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
201. Interview with in-house attorney at major technology company (Aug. 8, 2017)
(notes on file with Author).

Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)

696

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

2/12/2018 12:12 AM

[55:3

lawyers rarely talk to engineers to get that information. That same
attorney noted that he spends most of his time “talking to the CPO
and the general counsel. No one wants me talking to an engineer. I
need the CPO filter to translate what the engineer does into language
I can understand.” 202
5. Implications. These interviews allude to a narrative
running in parallel to that of the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground.
Although not all technologists and lawyers think about and
operationalize privacy in the same way, this research suggests that
the narrative describe in Privacy on the Ground may not yet be fully
realized. Rather, at some companies, a narrow understanding of
privacy may be factoring into the design on the ground. That may
help explain the privacy gaps in platforms like Snapchat and
Pokémon Go. In addition, the very existence of this trend has several
implications for privacy law and privacy’s place in society. I will touch
on four related points here, focusing on the impact on theory, law,
organizations, and individuals.
First, although some scholars rightly argue that privacy means
different things in different contexts, thus making a single definition
of privacy hard to pin down, the concept’s continued ambiguity is
having real effects on the ground. Daniel Solove, for example, has
argued that reducing privacy to a single common denominator misses
important aspects of privacy that are relevant in some contexts and
not others.203 Therefore, we should recognize that different invasions
of privacy implicate a series of privacy values, sometimes overlapping
and sometimes distinct.204 More recently, Helen Nissenbaum further
developed this point. Like Solove, who argued that privacy was a part
of social practice, Nissenbaum noted that the propriety of revelation
of someone else’s information varies with context. Because different
social interactions are governed by evolving norms informed by law,
history, and culture, our expectations as to what should happen to
our information varies by context, as well.205
These theories of privacy aptly capture a decidedly contextual
phenomenon, but they leave privacy open to attack as ambiguous.
And ambiguous concepts are hard to administer in the courts and on
the ground. When it comes to the law on the books, the lack of strong,
202. Interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (2) (Aug. 19, 2016) (notes on
file with Author).
203. See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 17, at 1092, 1127–29.
204. See id. at 1145–47; SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 117, at 8–11,
171–98.
205. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 43, at 134–35; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138 (2004).
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well-defined privacy norms allows competing rights, like free speech,
take precedence. 206 And by leaving a vacuum that notice-and-choice
has seemed to fill, robust conceptions of privacy have generally failed
to benefit from law’s powerful expressive capacity.207 When it comes
to privacy on the ground, privacy’s complexity hypnotizes
technologists and lawyers. To many, privacy is too complex,
“amorphous,” 208 and “subjective.” 209 As such, it is difficult to integrate
into product design. One of two simpler concepts—notice or
security—fills the void: it is harder for a company to wrestle with
evolving notions of consumer privacy than it is to draft a privacy
policy, add encryption on the back end of a product, and claim its
privacy responsibilities are complete. This suggests that privacy
scholarship must take into account administrability, not just with
respect to judges assessing privacy claims, all of whom have the
benefit of deliberation,210 but also with respect to privacy
professionals, designers, and lawyers who need a relatively simple
way of understanding the value and purpose of integrating user
expectations about privacy into design.
A second, but related implication of this research is that the
conflation of privacy and encryption appears to be crowding out
lawyers’ and privacy professionals’ focus on consumer privacy. The
legal community has been combining privacy and cyber security for
some time; law firm privacy practices are often “privacy and cyber
security” practices. 211 They may have learned this from the
206. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001); Michael Froomkin, CCR
Symposium: The Right to Remain Anonymous Matters, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 14,
2009), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/ccr_symposium_t_1.html. But
see Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1149, 154–55 (2005) (discussing and then critiquing the conventional discourse
suggesting free speech and privacy conflict). See also Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1408–09 (2000)
(discussing the debate of free speech and privacy).
207. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.10 (2000) (law is coercive and expressive of norms); Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard M. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1503, 1570–71 (2000) (what the law is establishes a set of agreed upon values);
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022, 2031
(1996) (law tells people what is socially harmful and signals appropriate behavior).
208. Senior engineer at Uber interview, supra note 114.
209. Telephone interview with attorney at AmLaw Top 100 firm (6) (Oct. 6, 2016)
(notes on file with Author). See also Glenn Chapman, New Google Security Chief Looks for
Balance with Privacy, PHYS.ORG (Apr. 18, 2015), http://phys.org/news/2015-04-google-chiefprivacy.html.
210. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 110, at 78 (discussing the need
to articulate the value of privacy so judges and policymakers can effectively weight it
against countervailing interests).
211. See, e.g., Privacy and Cybersecurity, PROSKAUER, http://www.proskauer.com/
practices/privacy-cybersecurity/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018); Litigation: Cybersecurity and
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companies they represent. At Google, for example, privacy and
security are blended together. 212 At Bloomberg LP, privacy and data
security are grouped together under “risk and compliance,” 213 which
reflects the view of the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s study that
privacy is about “managing risk.” 214 Industry trade conferences do
the same.215 Even state governments address the issues together. 216
But privacy and cyber security are not the same. Privacy is, at
its core, about the social relationships governing disclosure between
and among individuals and between users and the platforms that
collect, analyze, and manipulate their information for some purpose
(often for profit). 217 That is, ostensibly, why so many CPOs say they
think about privacy in terms of trust.218 Cyber security is far more
about preventing, assessing, and addressing attacks on data safety
and integrity. President Obama’s Cyberspace Policy Review, for
example, defined cyber security as “strategy . . . regarding the
security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompasses the full
range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence,
international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and
recovery policies and activities . . . as they relate to the security and
stability of the global information and communications
infrastructure.” 219 Legal scholars have offered similar definitions,
focused on “criminality” and “espionage” 220 or “using computer
Data Protection, PAUL WEISS, https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/cybersecuritydata-protection.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)).
212. See supra notes 149–160 and accompanying text.
213. Paul Wood, Chief Risk and Compliance Officer at Bloomberg LP, oversees data
security and privacy. Dan Doctoroff, Our New Chief Risk & Compliance Officer,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/ournew-chief-risk-compliance-officer/.
214. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 68.
215. See, e.g., PRIVACY+SECURITY FORUM, https://privacyandsecurityforum.com/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2018) (“The Privacy + Security Forum breaks down the silos of privacy and
security by bringing together seasoned thought leaders.”).
216. See, e.g., Washington State Announces Federal Cybersecurity Partnership, Office
of Privacy and Data Protection, GOVTECH. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/
security/Washington-State-Announces-Federal-Cybersecurity-Partnership-Office-ofPrivacy-and-Data-Protection.html.
217. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 43, at 71, 196; Waldman, supra note 18, at 561, 590–
601 (privacy is a social concept about how we relate to and share with others and the rest
of society).
218. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. The connection between privacy
and trust is a hot topic, of late. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 92, at 196–97; Richards &
Hartzog, supra note 18, at 447 (protecting privacy can build trust between online platforms
and consumers).
219. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A
TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2010),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final_0.pdf.
220. Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regarding the
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technology to engage in activity that undermines a society’s ability to
maintain internal or external order.” 221 Conflating the two often
means that consumer privacy gets short shrift. Technology
companies understand that a lack of cyber security is a threat to the
bottom line, 222 and they drill that concern into their engineers. As
several of them explained, the full breadth of their privacy-related
work was to prevent their products from getting hacked. The
non-security aspects of data privacy and consumer expectations
were, at best, secondary.
Third, these interviews reveal the potential for technologists’
ongoing resistance to input from others within the same
organization. Although some senior engineers noted that, upon
reflection, they would have welcomed input from privacy
professionals, 223 many technologists pushed back on working with
lawyers on design. Several noted that they “are the experts here.” 224
Several junior and senior engineers felt that “lawyers do not belong
in design” 225 beyond “telling us what to do so we don’t go to jail.” 226
One engineer noted that “the more other people, whether they be
lawyers or marketing people or a budget guy, are at every step along
the way during the design process, the more it’s going to get off the
rails, and then my team is going to get blamed for not meeting our
goals.” 227 This is a common struggle in large organizations. As
Renato Orsato, a sustainability scholar, has argued, employee
resistance to input and change can create an “arena in which an
indeterminate struggle unfolds,”228 hampering innovation and
productivity. 229 Resolving this tension undoubtedly requires more
than top-down input from a CPO or general counsel. Rather, it
demands building in organizational learning into the network
structure of the corporation.
Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 233, 235–36 (2010).
221. Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to
Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 381 (2007). For a
comprehensive summary of these and other definitions of cybersecurity, as well as a cogent
critique of the conventional wisdom, please see Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN.
L. REV. 584, 591–95 (2011).
222. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 276.
223. See, e.g., Engineer at large sharing economy company interview, supra note 143.
224. Silicon Valley engineer (4) interview, supra note 107.
225. Google employee interview, supra note 156.
226. Interview with web designer, supra note 145.
227. Senior product manager interview, supra note 170.
228. Renato J. Orsato, Frank den Hond, & Stewart Clegg, The Political Ecology of
Automobile Recycling in Europe, 23 ORG. STUD. 639, 654 (2002).
229. See Dean Bartlett, Embedding Corporate Responsibility: The Development of a
Transformational Model of Organizational Innovation, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 409, 414
(2009).
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Finally, the interviews with technologists paint a picture of
isolated design teams, staffed almost entirely by engineers, making
privacy decisions on the fly. In addition to this being an
organizational concern, 230 it also exacerbates technology’s bias
problem. Designers, most of whom are men, 231 either consciously
design for themselves or subconsciously design with all the implicit
biases that come with them.232 Like artificial intelligence systems
that develop biases by learning from limited inputs,233 technology
product designers translate their own biases into the devices they
create: products may fit in men’s front pockets, but not women’s;
mobile assistants understand voice commands like “I’m having a
heart attack,” a health crisis plaguing mostly men, but not “I’ve been
raped,” a trauma more likely to befall a woman; 234 apps may offer
benefits to those who permit constant, real time location tagging, but
they miss the fact that continuous tracking makes cyberstalking
easier; 235 dating tools may allow users to select “male” or “female” but
not “queer”; 236 and engineers may design online gaming platforms to
satisfy 12–18 year-old boys, but neglect to program in safeguards
that prevent, identify, and punish harassment, 237 most of which is

230. See infra Part IV.C.
231. Women remain a distinct minority among science and technology graduates
employed in inventor roles at large corporations. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., WOMEN,
MINORITIES, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Tbl. 5.1 (2015)
(2012 statistics show that women receive bachelor’s degrees in certain science fields at far
lower rates than men, including computer sciences (18.2%), engineering (19.2%), physics
(19.1%), and mathematics and statistics (43.1%)); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 35–36 (2014) (39% of chemists and
material scientists are women; 27.9% of environmental scientists and geoscientists are
women; 15.6% of chemical engineers are women; 12.1% of civil engineers are women; 8.3% of
electrical and electronics engineers are women; 17.2% of industrial engineers are women; and
7.2% of mechanical engineers are women).
232. See Crawford, supra note 162.
233. See Jeff Larson, Julia Angwin, & Terry Parris, Jr., How Machines Learn to be Racist,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/breaking-the-black-box-howmachines-learn-to-be-racist?word=cat.
234. Adam S. Miner et al., Smartphone-Based Conversational Agents and Responses to
Questions About Mental Health, Interpersonal Violence, and Physical Health, 176 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 619, 621–22 (2016).
235. See Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used To Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse
Victims, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2014/09/15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims.
236. See Rena Bivens & Oliver L. Haimson, Baking Gender Into Social Media Design: How
Platforms Shape Categories for Users and Advertisers, 2016 SOCIAL MEDIA + SOCIETY 1, 3–7
(2016); Rena Bivens, The Gender Binary Will Not Be Deprogrammed: Ten Years of Coding
Gender on Facebook, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1–2 (2015).
237. See Keith Stewart, Brianna Wu and the Human Cost of Gamergate: ‘Every Woman I
Know in the Industry is Scared’, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/oct/17/brianna-wu-gamergate-human-cost.
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based on gender. 238 These design omissions may not be purposeful or
malicious; rather, they stem from designers’ failure to appreciate the
distinct needs of marginalized populations not often represented in
the design process. The narrative described in this Article suggests
that the demographics of technology design teams within the
corporate organization may contribute to and metastasize the
discriminatory effects of implicit bias in design. Therefore,
embedding a robust, user-focused conception of privacy into the
design of technology products would not just align data collection
with user expectations. It would also have salutary effects on social
norms and social equality.
IV.

EMBEDDING ROBUST PRIVACY NORMS INTO DESIGN

Bamberger and Mulligan began a research agenda about
how technology companies are approaching consumer privacy. I
sought to determine if the narrative they found had been fully
realized. Relying on a series of interviews with technologists
and lawyers, this Article has so far shown that the robust
“company law” of privacy envisioned by the CPOs in Privacy on
the Ground may not yet have trickled down to those designing
technology products. At least among those interviewed, privacy
was either limited to notice or crowded out by cyber security.
And corporate privacy structures either encouraged the
minimization of privacy or stayed out of the fray all together.
The top-down approach, fueled by industry self-regulation, may
not be working. Although I do not mean to suggest that every
view of every technology product designer is reflected in these
interviews, this research raises the question of whether more
needs to be done to get engineers on board with privacy as part
of the design process.
Historical evidence and sociological studies of corporate
organizations suggest that embedding robust norms about
consumer demands that go beyond mere compliance with legal
requirements requires facilitating organizational learning.
That is, both organizational structures and the people that work
in them must adapt. They can do this through a multilevel
comprehensive approach that addresses all barriers to norm
diffusion, both within the corporation and in the social context
in which it operates. This approach, illustrated in Figure 1,
recognizes that organizational norms are the products of four
238. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 13–17 (2014)
(cyberharassment is often a gendered and sexualized phenomenon plaguing mostly women).
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outstanding influences. 239 Situated within a socio-legal context,
corporations are influenced by (1) scholarship and media
narratives conceptualizing their obligations, and (2) the web of
laws, court decisions, rules, and real and threatened litigations
that constitute the regulatory environment in which they, and
their competitors, exist. 240 As a collection of individuals working
toward the same goal, 241 corporations are also influenced by
endogenous factors, including (3) the corporate structure that
sets the frame for business routines and practice, and (4) the
embodied experiences of the real people doing the real work in
the company’s name. 242 Of course, many of these influences
overlap, but each works together to embed norms throughout
the corporation. The balance of this Article approaches the
problem of integrating privacy norms into design through this
four-tiered lens. In each section, the Article shows how the
current lack of embedded privacy norms can be partially
explained by gaps at each level. Then, using historical examples
of organizations adapting to meet changing legal and consumer
expectations, as well as research into organizational learning, I
suggest changes at each level that can help spread strong beliefs
in consumer privacy among designers on the ground.

239. This framework is adapted from work by Ruth Aguilera, a sociologist of business
and organizations, to understand why businesses engage in corporate social responsibility
programs that are not necessarily profit-oriented. See Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the
S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in
Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 836–37 (2007). Although there are differences
between encouraging technology companies to embed privacy into design and, say, pushing
companies to engage in socially beneficial initiatives, both require changes in
organizational norms away from a strict, profit-only perspective. Therefore, organizational
learning is important in both scenarios.
240. That other corporations in the same industry are similarly regulated
characterizes the context in which a given corporation responds to regulatory or social
demands. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 149.
241. See Andrew C. Inkpen & Eric W. K. Tsang, Social Capital, Networks, and
Knowledge Transfer, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 146, 148 (2005) (corporations are vertical,
structured networks of people operating under a unified corporate identity).
242. “Embodied” experience, or the idea that humans cannot divorce mental cognition
from physical life, emphasizes the practical, behavioral experiences of real people
interacting in contextual social situations. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN
THOUGHT 19, 21–22 (1999); MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
MERLEAU-PONTY 47–80, 138–81 (Alden L. Fisher ed., 1969); MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 207 (Colin Smith trans., 1962). In this context, this
means that engineers do not exist in vacuums: they approach the world and do their work
as fully realized embodied individuals, with unique backgrounds and biases.

Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)

2018]

2/12/2018 12:12 AM

703

DESIGNING WITHOUT PRIVACY
Figure 1:
Illustration of Multilevel Approach to Organizational Learning
Description

Level
Supra

Privacy Theory
Exogenous Factors

Macro

Privacy Law*
Endogenous
Factors

Meso

Organization Structure

Micro

Individuals

* U.S. federal law and state laws with national implications.

A. Conceptualizing Privacy for Design
Theory can offer professionals on the ground a solid
intellectual foundation for understanding their work and its role
in society at large. 243 It can also drive the media narrative that
shapes consumer expectations. The CPOs that spoke with
Bamberger and Mulligan recognized this implicitly when they
discussed the importance of conceptualizing privacy in such a way
as to allow them to influence corporate priorities. 244 To these
CPOs, privacy was a constantly evolving notion bound up with
user expectations and the trust between users and the company.
The outside lawyers and technologists I interviewed, however,
understood privacy far more narrowly, as either limited to notice
or synonymous with data security. To bring the latter more in line
with the former requires scholars to recognize the doctrinal
connection between privacy and trust.
243.
244.

SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 110, at 78.
See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 59–68.
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Traditional privacy scholarship, much of which has focused on
the right of individuals to maintain their autonomy, control over
information, and separation from the prying eyes of government
and society, does not do that. 245 It should come as little surprise,
then, that the law on the books 246 and practitioners on the
ground 247 see privacy through an autonomy lens, as well. But in a
world where sharing data is often a necessary prerequisite for
online interaction and where powerful internet companies collect,
use, and analyze massive amounts of information in ongoing
interactions with their users, concepts like control and autonomy
are inadequate. They fail to appreciate the relational aspects of
data flows. 248 More specifically, as I have argued elsewhere, users
hand over personal information to online platforms in contexts
characterized by trust, vulnerability, and an asymmetry of
power. 249 Therefore, building on Dan Solove’s and Helen
Nissenbaum’s work on the contextual, relational aspects of
privacy, I argue that, like the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground
suggested, privacy should be understood as a social concept based
on relationships of trust.
Trust is a resource of social capital between or among two or
more parties concerning the expectations that others will behave
according to accepted norms. 250 It is the “favorable expectation
regarding other people’s actions and intentions,” 251 or the belief
that others will behave in a predictable manner. For example, if I
ask a friend to hold my spare set of keys, I trust she will not break
in and steal from me. When an individual speaks with relative
strangers in a support group like Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), she
245. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, whose Harvard Law Review article began
the privacy discourse, understood privacy as a right “to be let alone.” Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890). The seminal
privacy law scholar Alan Westin took a similar autonomy-based approach, seeing privacy
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). For comprehensive reviews of the autonomy roots of many
traditional theories of privacy, see generally Cohen, supra note 206; Waldman, supra note
18, at 565–88.
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. See supra Part III.B.2.
248. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 43.
249. See generally Waldman, supra note 18.
250. Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes
on the Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1332 (1993).
251. Guido Möllering, The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of
Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension, 35 SOC. 403, 404 (2001). See also Ken Newton
and Sonja Zmerli, Three Forms of Trust and Their Association, 3 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 169,
171 (2011); J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as Social Reality, 63 SOCIAL FORCES
967, 968 (1985).
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trusts that they will not divulge her secrets. 252 Trust, therefore,
includes a willingness to accept some risk and vulnerability
toward others and steps in to grease the wheels of social activity: 253
I cannot know for certain that my neighbor will not abuse her key
privileges or that my fellow support group members will keep my
confidences, so trust allows me to interact with and rely on them.
And, breaches of those relationships—when neighbors break in or
when AA members share outside the group—are breaches of trust.
Information is exchanged with technology products and
platforms on similar terms. 254 We key in our credit card numbers,
financial information, and sexual preferences with the expectation
that commercial websites, online banks, and dating platforms will
keep our confidences. When they do not, it is primarily our trust
that has been violated, not our right to control information or keep
secrets, both of which we ceded long before the breach. 255
Conceptualizing privacy this way would bring privacy theory
in line with the views of the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s
research. It would give them an intellectual foundation upon
which to argue that protecting consumer privacy is an ongoing
responsibility based on the relationship between sharers and data
collectors rather than something to be crossed off a list of priorities
after drafting a privacy notice. The latter is a direct reflection of
autonomy-based privacy definitions. Privacy-as-trust, however,
means making privacy protection an integral part of companies’
ongoing relationships with their consumers.
B. Privacy Law as an Incentive to Act
Several interviews alluded to the fact that gaps in U.S. law
ensured that consumer privacy would remain a low priority. Even
when privacy issues were raised, lawyers and executives relied on
“the fairly low risk of an enforcement action from the FTC” as a
rationale for not pushing engineers to change design. 256 That must
change. Understanding the connection between privacy and trust
252. See Understanding Anonymity, https://www.aa.org/pages/en_US/understandinganonymity (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
253. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 4 (1979).
254. As Jack Balkin notes, obligations exist between two parties not because of the
content of those obligations, but because the relationship is enforceable through some legal
tool, i.e., a contract or, in the data sharing context, Balkin argues, a fiduciary relationship.
See Balkin, supra note 20, at 1205 n.104.
255. Dan Solove calls this problem the “secrecy paradigm,” where privacy rights are
extinguished upon revelation on the theory that once a piece of information is shared with
others, it can no longer be considered private. See SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 42–43, 143.
256. Former general counsel at New York technology company interview, supra note 139.
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has several implications for privacy law that can help embed
strong privacy norms into technology product design. 257
Expectations of trust form the basis for the law to treat some data
collectors as fiduciaries of our information. 258 In addition, a strong
privacy tort regime could vindicate our rights and incentivize
companies to take our privacy seriously. We have seen this work
before. Citizen tort litigation pushed the automobile and
pharmaceutical industries to embed consumer safety into car and
drug designs. The same can now be done for privacy. In addition,
many of the interviews I conducted with technologists that took
their privacy obligations seriously worked at companies that had
been on the receiving end of strong, disruptive regulatory
interventions. This opens a path for the FTC to play an even more
significant role in incentivizing companies to design consumer
privacy protections into their products.
Treating some data collectors as information fiduciaries, as
Jack Balkin has suggested, would go far toward incentivizing
companies to integrate privacy into design. Fiduciaries are those
that have special obligations of loyalty to another. 259 Those
loyalties are based on trust: a trustor, client, or beneficiary hands
over money, control, and information to another, who, in turn, has
a duty not to betray that trust. 260 Therefore, if we recognize that
the exchange of personal information depends upon similar
relationships of trust and confidence, many technology companies
can be seen fiduciaries of our data. 261 This is true for the same
reasons money managers, estate trustees, and doctors are
fiduciaries. First, our relationship with many online platforms is
asymmetrical: Facebook and Amazon, for example, know a lot
about us; we know very little about how their algorithms use our
data. 262 Second, we are completely dependent on these platforms
for a variety of social, professional, commercial, informational,
educational, and financial services. And we use them with the
expectation that they will not misuse our data in the process.
Third, many online platforms are experts at what they do: Google’s
257. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 349 (1997) (discussing how law can influence norms).
258. See generally Balkin, supra note 20.
259. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4 (2011).
260. Id. at 4, 106–08.
261. Jack Balkin refers to these companies as “information fiduciaries.” Balkin, supra
note 20, at 1209. See also Richards & Solove, supra note 21, at 156–58.
262. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1222. See also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015)
(discussing the “black box” of information algorithms).
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search and OK Cupid’s matching algorithms are supposedly the
best around, and they market themselves that way. Therefore, we
hand over our information—from our search histories to intimate
sexual desires—to these platforms in exchange for some benefit,
trusting them to use our data in ways we expect. 263 Given these
similarities, it makes logical sense to treat such platforms as
fiduciaries of our information and hold their feet to the fire when,
if ever, they violate their duty of loyalty.
Though sometimes overlapping with fiduciary law, 264 tort law
offers a parallel track for vindicating the privacy rights of victims
of privacy-invasive design. To date, though, it has mostly failed in
that regard: data breach and invasion of privacy victims rarely
have standing to sue the companies that are supposed to keep
their data private, so their cases are dismissed even when a
company negligently caused a data breach. 265 This allowed Google,
for example, to avoid responsibility for violating a do-not-track
promise because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate how tracking
actually hurt them. 266 And it has allowed companies that leave
their databases open to hacks and other cyberattacks to avoid tort
liability because, absent direct evidence that hackers used a
plaintiff’s data to harm her financially, data breach claims are
merely “allegations of hypothetical, future injury.” 267
These standing problems have neutered what should be an
effective incentive for companies to act on privacy. We have seen
tort law serve this function before. For example, when Americans
first began driving cars, they did so in a regulatory void. There was
also little social demand for corporate responsibility for
automotive safety. 268 Ralph Nader’s 1965 book, Unsafe at Any
263. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1222.
264. See FRANKEL, supra note 259, at 240–41 (fiduciary duties and tort obligations
have certain similarities, but should be considered distinct).
265. See, e.g., Dwyer v. American Express, 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1352–53 (Ill. App. 1995).
After learning that American Express designed a system to track cardholder spending
habits, aggregate that data, and create detailed user profiles for targeted advertising,
several cardholders objected, arguing that the company intruded into their private
information and appropriated it without their consent. The court disagreed on both counts.
The information was not private, having already been handed over to American Express
every time a card was used to make a purchase. Id. at 1354. And, in any event, cardholders
never suffered any cognizable injury: customer tracking and profiling did not “deprive any
of the cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.” Id. at 1356.
266. In re Google, Inc. Cookie Placement Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434, 442 (D.
Del. 2013).
267. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2011).
268. See MICHAEL R. LEMOV, CAR SAFETY WARS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND DEATH xiii (2015); MARTIN ALBAUM, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY
SAFETY, SAFETY SELLS: MARKET FORCES AND REGULATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
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Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile,
changed that. Outraged that Chevrolet both sold the Corvair
knowing its dangers and refused to design in life saving tools, 269
the public pushed Congress to act 270 and started bringing
consumer safety lawsuits against carmakers. For fifty years before
Unsafe at Any Speed, carmakers’ only obligation was to make cars
“free from hidden defects.” 271 That changed in 1968, when, via a
negligence action against General Motors, a court imposed on
automakers a duty of reasonable care to design cars that would
“avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury”
during a collision. 272 Private tort litigation continued to vindicate
consumer demands for safe automobiles 273 and forced carmakers
to improve fuel tank safety, 274 protect drivers against side impact
crashes, 275 and design better seat belts, 276 roofs, 277 doors, 278 and
much more. 279 Tort cases had similar effects on drug safety. 280
These cases pushed companies to integrate safety into design
as a matter of course. It worked for three reasons. First, many of
these cases resulted in significant settlement costs, incentivizing
companies to take preventative action to avoid devastating,

AIRBAGS 1 (2005).
269. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 86 (1965).
270. See Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE
L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2002). Congress passed, and President Johnson signed, the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the Highway Safety Act in 1966. See id. at 1304.
Highway safety regulation was tasked to the new National Highway Safety Bureau, later
renamed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. See id. at 1305–06.
271. Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966).
272. Larson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
273. See, e.g., Dyson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (car
companies must design “a reasonably safe container within which to make [a] journey”).
274. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). This
case concerned the infamous Ford Pinto, which had a tendency to explode.
275. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
276. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Moran, 231 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2007, pet.
granted, judgment vacated w.r.m.).
277. Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807 (Neb. 2006).
278. Seliner v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2002-30454 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 2004).
279. See AM. ASSOC. FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION SPURRED AUTO
SAFETY INNOVATIONS 4–9 (2010).
280. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 925–27 (Cal. 1980) (“During the
period defendants marketed DES, they knew or should have known that it was a
carcinogenic substance, that there was a grave danger after varying periods of latency it
would cause cancerous and precancerous growths in the daughters of the mothers who took
it, and that it was ineffective to prevent miscarriage. Nevertheless, defendants continued
to advertise and market the drug as a miscarriage preventative. They failed to test DES for
efficacy and safety.”).
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company-threatening damages. 281 Second, private tort litigation
supplemented overworked and underfunded regulatory
structures. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
the federal agency tasked with developing rules for car and driver
safety, is small, subject to budgetary and staffing limitations, and
at risk of regulatory capture. 282 As recently as 2014, its few staffers
were responsible for dealing with up to 80,000 complaints per
year. 283 Legitimate complaints were missed. Tort litigants rushed
in to fill the void. Third, the high-profile nature of tort lawsuits
resulting in damage awards allowed these cases to have an
expressive effect. By becoming part of the governing legal and
media discourse about technology, industry, and corporate social
responsibility, these cases helped solidify safety expectations
among members of the public and forced even recalcitrant
companies to act. 284
Today, consumers interested in protecting their privacy do not
benefit from any of these factors. Data collectors rarely pay
damages in privacy tort cases, leaving the understaffed FTC to
protect consumer privacy on its own. And popular opinion on
corporate privacy responsibility is, like the technologist’s vision of
privacy, limited to data security. Data breaches that affected
Target, Sony, and others receive significant press; the privacy
issues associated with social networks, data aggregation, and
black box and predictive algorithms do not. A robust tort regime
can change that. As Dan Solove and Danielle Citron argue, courts
should recognize the intangible, but no less damaging, harms
associated with data breaches and invasions of privacy. 285 There
is, after all, much precedent for them to follow. 286 And by
281. For example, Grimshaw, the Ford Pinto case, resulted in damages, later reduced,
of $125 million. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 771, 772 n.1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981).
282. See, e.g., Dan Becker & James Gerstenzang, Safety Sacrificed in NHTSA
Revolving Door, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2015/02/25/nhtsa-revolving-door-cronyism-highway-column/23966219/
(citing inspector general report).
283. See Scott Evans, How NHTSA Missed the GM Ignition Switch Defect,
MOTORTREND (June 15, 2015), http://www.motortrend.com/news/how-nhtsa-missed-thegm-ignition-switch-defect/.
284. Famous tort cases are not only taught to all law students in their Torts or
Products Liability classes. They are part of popular culture: books and movies have been
made about many. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (based on the Anderson
v. Cryovac, the trichloroethylene toxic tort case in Woburn, Massachusetts); A CIVIL ACTION
(Touchstone Pictures 1998).
285. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Privacy and Data Security Harms
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with Author).
286. Courts have been recognizing intangible, emotional, and other non-pecuniary
harms for decades. Indeed, Warren and Brandeis spent most of their article, The Right to
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vindicating these more intangible privacy rights, a renewed
privacy tort regime can ensure that companies that collect data
bring their privacy obligations out from under the shadow of data
security.
The capacity for law to influence design does not stop at
fiduciary duties of loyalty and tort duties of reasonable care. Over
the course of several interviews at major technology companies, I
found that many of the designers who expressed a commitment to
integrating privacy into design reflected on the impact of
regulatory enforcement on their employers. “I’ve been here a long
time, and we remember what it was like” under a consent decree.
“No one wants to be the one who’s responsible for that happening
again. We just don’t want to mess this up.” 287 Another designer
who works in artificial intelligence said bluntly: “We take this
seriously, from my team all the way up to” the CEO of the company
“because we don’t want that happening again, and it’s on us to
make sure it doesn’t.” 288
But not all consent decrees are created equal. Google has been
the subject of an FTC order, 289 and so has Facebook. 290 Neither
have particularly good reputations for protecting user privacy and,
with respect to Google, many of its current and former engineers
report that the company’s vaunted privacy structures are
relatively weak or inert. 291 Strong regulatory interventions that
require more than a “comprehensive privacy program,” together
with executive- and management-level commitments to
compliance, appear to be more effective. My interviews showed
that employees working at companies who have experienced such
powerful orders were far more capable of articulating specific ways
they integrate privacy into design than those at companies where
regulatory orders involved simple fines or one or two new hires.
This suggests that the FTC should not be shy about imposing
significant penalties and demanding comprehensive, specific
Privacy, proving that the common law has evolved to recognize intangible harms. See
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 245, at 193–94.
287. Interview with engineer at major technology company (Aug. 7, 2017) (notes on file
with Author). The particular “consent decree” to which this interviewee referred is
purposely omitted to maintain the confidentiality of the subject and his or her employer.
288. Interview with engineer focused on artificial intelligence at major technology
company (Aug. 6, 2017) (notes on file with Author).
289. See, e.g., Decision and Order, In the Matter of Google, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 102
3136, Docket No. C-4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzdo.pdf.
290. See, e.g., Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc.,
F.T.C. File No 092 3184 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf.
291. See supra notes 149–160 and accompanying text.
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structural changes to companies that violate their users’ privacy
expectations.
C. Organizational Structure and Organizational Learning
So far, we have discussed the role played by privacy theory and
the legal relationship between users and data collectors—exogenous
forces that help map the context in which technology companies
operate—in pushing those companies to embed trust-based
privacy norms into design. The next two sections address
endogenous factors—corporate organization and the embodied
experiences of technology workers themselves—and show how
both may hinder the diffusion of norms throughout a given
company. Changes that enhance organizational learning and
expose engineers to new people, new ideas, and new perspectives,
however, can make it more likely all parties in the design process
share the same vision for privacy.
Again, history is a guide. Sociological and management
studies on the integration of social responsibility priorities into the
corporate ethos, practice, and routine point to several
organizational steps companies can take to change the status quo.
Corporations, like all organized bureaucracies dedicated to
achieving a particular purpose, 292 use routines and internal
practices to achieve their desired results and reduce uncertainty,
mistakes, and deviation along the way. 293 Sometimes, though,
structures become ossified and stifle innovation. 294 But corporate
organization can be nudged to enhance organizational learning, or
the process through which workers not only learn from each other,
but also spread and embed new practices, new perspectives, and
new norms. 295 In these ways, organizational learning will help the
CPO’s vision of privacy reach her workers on the ground. Based on
that research and my interviews with technologists, three
292. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 147.
293. The seminal work on the emergence of deviance, or behaviors that violate the
norms of some group, in organizational practice is DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER
LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 58, 102–18,
148–52, 190–95, 405–09 (1996).
294. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 147 (bureaucracy is difficult to change
once imposed).
295. See Amy C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in
Organizations: A Group-Level Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES
AND RELATIONSHIPS 631 (Mary Goodwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittel eds., 2012) [hereinafter,
ORGANIZATIONS]. See also François Maon, Adam Lindgreen, & Valérie Swaen, Designing
and Implementing Corporate Social Responsibility: An Integrative Framework Grounded in
Theory and Practice, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 71–72 (2008) (adoption of social responsibility
strategy considered an organizational learning and change process).

Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)

712

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

2/12/2018 12:12 AM

[55:3

structural limitations built into some corporate organizations
have prevented robust privacy norms from reaching those
designers: profit prioritization, departmental siloization, and
instability in engineering staffing. This section addresses each in
turn.
Profit Prioritization and Company Climate. My interviews
suggested that many technology companies recognized the
revenue implications of incomplete data security, 296 but not of poor
consumer privacy. Indeed, the lack of internal corporate emphasis
on privacy suggests that many companies approached it as
another form of low-priority corporate social responsibility (CSR)
while adopting the rhetoric of consumer privacy and trust.
CSR programs are company initiatives that do not necessarily
generate revenue but improve social welfare in some way. 297
Companies create them for many reasons, 298 but they sometimes
have to fight for attention against core corporate priorities. 299 This
is particularly true for privacy. The collection, use, and sale of
consumer data are often integral to technology companies’
business models: Facebook and Google use personal data to sell
targeted advertisements; dating websites promise compatible
romantic matches in exchange for personal information and a
monthly membership fee; and most online platforms collect data
to optimize site performance and user experiences. Therefore,
putting limitations on data collection would seem to be bad for
business.
But contrary to conventional wisdom, privacy is actually good
for business. Companies that rely on consumers sharing
information with them and with each other need their consumers’
trust. 300 Without trust, sharing stops. 301 And protecting our
privacy is a central tool for gaining our trust, especially as we
become more savvy Internet users. Even when privacy protections
are seen as complications in a pure profit-seeking world based on
data collection and analysis, protecting privacy can either give a
company a competitive advantage on the market 302 or prove its
296. See, e.g., supra notes 122–128 and accompanying text.
297. See Aguilera et al., supra note 239, at 836–37.
298. See, e.g., Peter Arlow & Martin J. Gannon, Social Responsiveness, Corporate
Structure, and Economic Performance, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 235, 236 (1982) (chief executive
interest, powerful social movements, for example).
299. See, e.g., id. (reviewing literature showing only 1/5 of managers considered social
responsibility a top five priority).
300. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 454.
301. See Waldman, Privacy As Trust, supra note 18.
302. See Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics
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CSR bone fides. As Bamberger and Mulligan argued, it is the
responsibility of the company’s executives to recognizes these
opportunities. The CPO or CEO must raise awareness internally
about privacy, set the tone for corporate action, and establish
guideposts for marking success or failure. This type of executive
responsibility is nothing new: Ikea executives set the tone for
addressing the company’s use of child labor in the 1990s by talking
about the company’s responsibility in the media, embedding
opposition to the practice in a mission statement, and discussing
their commitment to fighting the practice with managers and
other employees. 303 Apple’s Tim Cook did the same during his
company’s fight with the FBI over the latter’s attempt to conscript
Apple to bypass security features on the iPhone of Syed Farook,
the man who killed 14 and injured 22 people at the Inland
Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. 304 In other words,
executives, like the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground, have to
establish what Martha Feldman and Brian Pentland called the
“ostensive” aspect of a corporate routine on privacy, or the
subjective understanding that consumer privacy is part of the
corporate mission. 305
Empirical evidence bears this out. Oshrat Ayalon, Eran Toch,
Irit Hadar, and Michael Birnhack recently showed that a
corporate climate dedicated to privacy has a more significant
impact on designers than formal policies, legal decisions, or
continuing education. 306 My interviews found the same:
technologists at two different large technology companies, one
with executives that take seriously issues like accessibility, social
responsibility, and privacy, and one with executives that do not,
had radically different approaches to integrating privacy into
design. The former recognized privacy issues and evidenced a
commitment to coming up with privacy fixes and even delaying or
canceling product rollouts if it did not meet corporate privacy
and Economics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404, 411, 421–22 (1995) (ethical behavior can help a
company achieve competitive advantage on the market); Michael V. Russo & Paul A. Fouts,
A Resource Based Perspective on Corporate Environmental Performance and Profitability,
40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 534, 535–36 (1997) (similar, focusing on environmental conduct).
303. See Maon, Lindgreen, & Swaen, supra note 295, at 78.
304. See A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/
customer-letter/; Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San
Bernardino Gunman’s iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/18/technology/apple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html.
305. Feldman & Pentland, supra note 78, at 101.
306. Oshrat Ayalon et al., How Developers Make Design Decisions About Users’
Privacy: The Place of Professional Communities and Organizational Climate, in
COMPANION OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE
WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING (2017).
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standards. 307 The latter generally found it difficult to
conceptualize privacy, let alone integrate it into their work.
Departmental Siloization. Several engineers reported that
their engineering teams were separated from other corporate
departments, including privacy. 308 But siloization is fatal to the
diffusion of norms throughout a company. As Andrew Inkpen and
Eric Tseng showed, corporate structures that separate networks
of individuals erode trust and, as a result, prevent the exchange of
information. 309 We saw this happen at Google. Its large privacy
and security structure was mostly separate from the engineering
teams on the ground. As a result, several engineers resisted
privacy professionals’ input. Siloization also had a negative effect
on the privacy team’s work. Despite its robust structure, privacy
at Google fell into a compliance role, with engineers briefly
running their designs by privacy much like they would run them
by the marketing or legal departments. 310
Not all design teams are so siloed. Several technologists at a
large financial services firm spoke of working on design teams that
were fully integrated into the larger corporate structure. Each
team included a “risk and security” representative as well as a
non-technologist manager who was not only responsible for
facilitating cross-departmental connections, but also “had the
knowledge base and trust of the other people that [technologists]
had to work with.” 311 Another engineer continued:
We worked in teams, obviously with other engineers, but also
with artistic designers, security people, a product manager,
and a finance guy. The finance guy actually surprised me,
but his job was actually pretty essential: if we’re designing
for people like him, it was a great resource to have him in
those [design] meetings.312
This comment alludes to a radically different approach to
design than the one reflected in many of my interviews with
technologists. Not only was this team connected to the larger
network of the corporation, it also included a stand-in for users,
307. This is based on a series of interviews conducted with, among others, engineers
and technologists at a large technology company over August 6 and 7, 2017 (notes on file
with Author).
308. See supra Part III.B.2.
309. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 152–54.
310. See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text.
311. Telephone interview with engineer at large financial services company (1) (Oct.
21, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
312. Telephone interview with engineer at financial services firm (2) (Oct. 26, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
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allowing the team to design for its customer base rather than for
the engineers themselves. As a result, this team’s engineers
learned from their coworkers. 313 One engineer explained that “it
was great to have the guy with a finance background on the team;
he taught me a few things about how [the product] is used.” 314 That
learning was reflected in design in real ways: “he was integral in
changing . . . design. He told us about desk clutter, the speed with
which his colleagues use [the product], when they use it and how.
I wouldn’t have known that stuff.” Although this team’s privacy
member was really a “risk and security” expert, a privacy
representative could raise consumer privacy issues much in the
same way the finance professional raised issues from his own
experience. 315
Instability in engineering staffing. Engineers reported a high
degree of turnover among their teams. 316 Such instability disrupts
the diffusion and maintenance of strong organizational norms and
culture. 317 As Amy Edmondson, an expert on the work of teams in
corporate environments, has shown, frequent staffing changes
make it difficult for members of teams to trust one another. And
without some level of trust—in a worker’ technical skill, dedication
to the work, and commitment to others—team members do not
have the confidence to reflect, ask challenging questions, and solve
problems. Indeed, stable membership is essential for learning
among team members: repeated interactions allow workers to
share experiences and provide “psychological safety” for team
members to challenge each other’s assumptions. 318
Attrition rates among engineers are high because of the
demanding nature of the work at technology companies, where
80-hour weeks are routine. 319 Perks like Ping-Pong tables, fitness
centers, on-site haircuts, and free food may attract new hires, but
actually facilitate long hours in difficult conditions. 320 To date,
313. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 149, 154; Edmondson, supra note 295,
at 632–33.
314. Financial services engineer (1) interview, supra note 311.
315. The integration of users into the design process is the subject of a long research
agenda among sociologists of technology. For a collection of insightful essays on this topic,
please see HOW USERS MATTER: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF USERS AND TECHNOLOGY (Nelly
Oudshoorn & Trevor Pinch eds., 2005).
316. See supra note 161.
317. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 153.
318. See Edmondson, supra note 295, at 633.
319. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor & David Streitfeld, Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in
a Bruising Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/
technology/inside-amazon-wrestling-big-ideas-in-a-bruising-workplace.html?_r=0.
320. See also David Auerbach, I’ve Worked Insanely Demanding Tech Jobs, SLATE
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many technology companies approach their long hours as badges
of honor and reflections of the high-achieving workers they hire.
Plus, engineers can be replaced rather easily. 321 Doing so at high
rates, however, makes it difficult for company norms to embed
within design teams on the ground. A more effective effort at
retention can help change that.
D. The Embodied Experience of Designers on the Ground
Many of these organizational factors, which speak to the
ability of a corporation as a whole to adapt and change, also apply
to individual workers’ capacity to learn from each other.
Individual-level learning is, of course, essential to embracing new
organizational norms up and down the corporate hierarchy. 322
Engineers are not just trained robots; they perform their jobs 323
with particular perspectives, cognitive frames, and embodied
experiences that translate into the products they design. As the
interviews reported in this Article suggest, that background can
sometimes act as a barrier to the diffusion of robust privacy norms.
Some interviewees reported rarely, if ever, interacting with
coworkers who were not also engineers. Some noted that the
demands on them were so significant and constant, 324 that when
they were forced to make privacy-related decisions, they would fall
back on their own judgment and education, the latter of which
never included few, if any, references to privacy or ethics in design.
Moreover, these engineers worked in teams whose members
looked exactly like them: they came from the same backgrounds,
schools, and family experiences. 325 Exposing engineers to new
people and new ideas through changes in technology education
and increased social interaction within the corporation, however,
can help change that. This section addresses both of those
pathways, in turn.
(Aug. 17, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/08/
amazon_abuse_of_white_collar_workers_i_worked_at_microsoft_and_google_and.html
(noting the attrition rate among technology workers).
321. See, e.g., Taylor Soper, Analysis: The Exploding Demand for Computer Science
Education, and Why America Needs to Keep Up, GEEK WIRE (June 6, 2014, 10:51 AM),
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/analysis-examining-computer-science-education-explosion/.
322. See Edmondson, supra note 295, at 632 (organizations cannot change when they
ignore the experiences of their workers).
323. In Feldman’s and Pentland’s two-tiered framework for understanding corporate
routines, executives establish the “ostensive” aspect, or guiding mission and understanding,
of the routine, while workers on the ground “perform” the routine or translate the mission
into practice. See Feldman & Pentland, supra note 78, at 101.
324. See Start-up programmer interview, supra note 141.
325. See Silicon Valley engineer interview, supra note 161.
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The cognitive frames through which we see the world and
approach new problems 326 are significantly influenced by our
education. But most technology companies hire their engineers
from the same schools, most of which neglect to include privacy
and ethics in their curricula. I conducted a LinkedIn search for
technology talent at Google, Facebook, and Apple and found that
nearly 38% come from just the top 5 engineering and computer
science programs in the United States, as rated by U.S. News and
World Report. 327 Those curricula are quite similar, and notable in
several respects.
The first notable characteristic of technology education in the
United States is that there is severe demographic inequality in
engineering and computer science faculties. The imbalance is
worst at Stanford’s electrical engineering department, where only
7 out of 63 faculty members are women (11.1%). 328 Stanford also
has the worst gender imbalance in its computer science faculty,
where only 5 out of 57 are women. That means there are nearly 12
men for every one woman. At the University of Illinois, which has
the fifth highest ranked computer science program in the country,
there are 13 women on a faculty of 74. MIT fares the best: 18.5%
of its Electrical Engineering and Computer Science faculty are
women. 329 Racial and ethnic diversity is even worse. There is not
326. See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially
Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 946, 946–47 (2007) (discussing the literature).
327. To calculate this estimate, I searched for all LinkedIn members who listed
“engineer” as their job and Google, Facebook, or Apple as a place of employment, either
current or former. I then filtered those results by education, searching for the top 5
engineering and computer science programs, as listed by U.S. News and World Report. See
Best Undergraduate Engineering Programs, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/engineering (last visited Jan. 22, 2018);
Best Undergraduate Computer Engineering Programs, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/engineering-doctorate-computer
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2018). These data are imperfect: only a subset of technology talent at these
companies have LinkedIn profiles and only a subset of them list their education. That said,
the purpose of including this statistic is not to argue that it represents the entire
population. My goal is more modest: to show that there is reason to believe there is a high
concentration of engineering talent from the top 5 schools in the United States at major
technology companies. This is not controversial. Max Nisen, What Facebook, Twitter, Google,
and Apple Employees Have in Common, QUARTZ (Mar. 7, 2014), https://qz.com/183958/whatfacebook-twitter-google-and-apple-employees-have-in-common/.
328. The gender imbalance at the other top 5 engineering programs is as follows:
Berkeley’s Electrical Engineering and Computer Science faculty and CalTech’s Electrical
Engineering faculty are only 12.5% women (17 out of 136 and 3 out of 24, respectively). At
Georgia Tech’s Electrical Engineering and Computer Science program, 13.2% of faculty are
women (19 out of 143).
329. At Carnegie Mellon, 16 out of 101 (15.8%) are women. At Berkeley, 10 out of 84
(11.9%) are women.
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a single black or Latino/a faculty member in CalTech’s engineering
department. Larger faculties are also homogeneous. At Berkeley’s
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science department, there
is one black faculty member and not a single Latino/a. Illinois’s
computer science faculty has the same numbers (or lack thereof).
In total, if you aggregate the faculties at the top five computer
science schools, there are only seven black and twelve Latino/a
faculty members. In engineering departments, there are ten black
faculty members and only two Latino/as. There is not a single
openly queer person on the electrical engineering and computer
science faculties at any of the top five schools. 330
But numbers tell only part of the story. Women who make it
through the patriarchal gauntlet to find a technology job face
hostility and discrimination when they get there. Studies show
that women in technology careers are belittled, condescended to,
ignored, and hear sexually harassing language in the office. 331 It
is no wonder that although many young girls express interest in
tech careers, only 11% of teenage women actually expect to go into
the field. 332 And queer engineers are forced into the closet by
330. These imbalances manifest outside the classroom and help embed implicit biases. In
March 2017, Goldman Sachs hosted a two-day technology conference in which 93% of the
speakers were men. Matthew Zeitlin, This Goldman Sachs Conference Has 76 Speakers
and Only Five Are Women, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:52 AM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/matthewzeitlin/this-goldman-sachs-conference-has-76-speakersand-only-five?utm_term=.geNR2RKPK#.do0747ePe. The year before, there was an all-male
panel on women’s equality at Davos. Jessica Roy, All-Male Panel About Women’s Equality Not
Exactly Equal, THE CUT (Jan. 22, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.thecut.com/2016/01/davos-allmale-panel-on-womens-equality.html. PayPal did the same thing in April 2016. Dayna Evans,
Ah, Yes: Another All-Male Panel on the Issue of Gender Equality, THE CUT (Apr. 21, 2016, 5:52
PM), https://www.thecut.com/2016/04/paypal-to-hold-all-male-panel-on-gender-equality.html.
Male-only panels at technology conferences are so common that the phenomenon spawned a
satirical blog (“Congrats, You Have an All-Male Panel!”), a game of Female Conference Speaker
Bingo, and even a portmanteau (“manel”). See Congrats, You Have an All-Male Panel,
http://allmalepanels.tumblr.com/;Elan Morgan, Good Read: Jezebel’s Female Conference Speaker
Bingo, GENDER AVENGER (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.genderavenger.com/blog/2014/2/25/anoldie-but-a-goodie-jezebels-female-conference-speaker-bingo. This isn’t surprising, given the
inequality that exists in the field, but it’s easily remedied: there are literally thousands of women
working in technology who can step in. Melanie Ehrenkranz, Think There Aren’t Any Qualified
Women in Tech? Here are 1,000 Names. No More Excuses., MIC (May 2, 2017),
https://mic.com/articles/175136/women-in-tech-1000-names-no-more-all-male-panelsconferences#.rUuZ3XO37. The continued silencing of women’s voices, however, shows one way
that the lack of diversity among technology faculty follows technologists wherever they go,
helping to entrench and reinforce gender, racial, and sexual stereotypes.
331. See Nadya A. Fouad, Leaning in, but Getting Pushed Back (and Out),
Presentation at the American Psychology Association Annual Convention, August 2014,
available at https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/08/pushed-back.pdf.See also
Kate Conger, Exclusive: Here’s the Full 10-Page Anti-Diversity Screed Circulating
Internally at Google [Updated], GIZMODO (Aug. 5, 2017, 7:25 PM ET),
http://gizmodo.com/exclusive-heres-the-full-10-page-anti-diversity-screed-1797564320.
332. See Jillian Berman, Teenage Boys and Girls Are Choosing Very Different Careers,
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deeply entrenched heteronormativity. 333 Lesbian, gay, and
bisexual engineering students have reported hearing frequent
expressions of sexual prejudice and have to navigate demands for
conformity by compartmentalizing their lives, staying in the
closet, and depriving themselves of social connections. 334 Gay male
engineering students often feel the need to “cover” or “pass” as
heterosexual because nonconformity is frowned upon. 335 Queer
engineering students reported being told that issues of sexuality
and gender identity are “irrelevant” in engineering. 336 What’s
more, prevailing gender norms in the industry mean that they
would be discredited or ignored as engineers if they came out; in
other words, they would be (mis)treated by their peers the same
way those peers (mis)treat women. 337 Because heterosexual
students face none of these oppressive demands, their academic
experiences are likely more fulfilling and less stressful. 338
The lack of women, persons of color, and queer technologists
and the absence of diverse faculty at leading engineering and
computer science programs impacts designing for privacy directly
and indirectly. Homogeneity directly factors into design. Many
designers I interviewed suggested it was difficult to design for
diverse audiences, so they excluded diversity metrics from the
design process and failed to grapple with the sometimes-differing
privacy needs of different social groups. This has real,
demonstrable effects on the ground. According to a comprehensive
study by ProPublica, software that calculated recidivism risk in
criminals was racist: it was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black
defendants as being at a higher risk of committing future crimes
and twice as likely to incorrectly flag white defendants as low
MARKETWATCH (June 5, 2017, 9:32 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/teenage-boysand-girls-are-choosing-very-different-careers-2017-06-01 (reporting on a survey of 1000 13
to 17-year olds conducted by Junior Achievement, a youth-focused nonprofit organization).
333. See Erin A. Cech & Tom J. Waidzunas, Navigating the Heteronormativity of
Engineering: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Students, 3 ENGINEERING
STUD. 1, 2–3 (2011).
334. Id. at 8–11. In many ways, the experiences of the engineering students
interviewed by Cech and Waidzunas mirror the experiences of queer service members in
the United States military before the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”. In both cases,
queer individuals were forced to erase their personal lives and have to constantly navigate
social situations in ways that would reduce the risk of being outed. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670–73
(1993), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat.
3515 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2012)).
335. See Cech & Waidzunas, supra note 333, at 13. See also KENJI YOSHINO,
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
336. Id. at 11.
337. Id. at 12.
338. Id. at 2.
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risk. 339 Indirectly, the lack of diversity on any metric tends to stifle
innovative problem solving. 340 Engineers from the same
background might approach in similar ways; engineers who have
had different life experiences, particularly with technology, may
be able to spot privacy issues and work through them in ways
others can’t. And designing for privacy in a profit-seeking world
often requires creative, outside-the-box thinking because
companies to look at design in new ways. Two heads are better the
one, but only if the heads aren’t identical.
Another feature of technology education today is that both
privacy and ethics are inconspicuous in engineering schools’
course catalogs and curricula. The California Institute of
Technology, commonly known as CalTech, is one of the highest
ranking undergraduate electrical engineering programs in the
United States. 341 Neither the words “privacy” nor “security”, or
derivations thereof, are used in the descriptions of the program’s
required courses or recommended electives. 342 In the school’s
entire course catalog, the word privacy fares a little better, but the
opportunities are a little far afield. The computer science and
social science curricula jointly offer an elective called “Introduction
to Data Privacy,” which covers several important topics, including
defining privacy and the tradeoff between “useful computation on
large datasets and the privacy of those from whom the data is
derived,” and reaches beyond the engineering silo to leverage work
from “economics, statistics, information theory, game theory,
probability, learning theory, geometry, and approximation
algorithms” to better understand privacy from a “mathematical”
perspective. 343 There is also a political science course called “The
Supreme Court in U.S. History,” which, among other topics, covers
privacy and the Fourth Amendment. 344 And CalTech’s science
departments offer “Social Media for Scientists,” which teaches
339. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.
340. L. Richard Hoffman & Norman R.F. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem
Solving by Members of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. Abnormal & Social
Psych. 401, 404 (1961). See also MARVIN E. SHAW, RHONA ROBBIN, & JAMES R. BELSER,
GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR (1981) (reviewing the
research on the effect of group heterogeneity on problem solving).
341. See Best Undergraduate Engineering Programs, supra note 327.
342. See Undergraduate Program, CAL. INST. OF TECH.: DEPT. OF ELECTRICAL ENG’G,
http://ee.caltech.edu/academics/ugrad; Courses, CAL. INST. OF TECH.: DEPT. OF ELECTRICAL
ENG’G, http://ee.caltech.edu/academics/course_desc.
343. See CAL. INST. OF TECH., CALTECH CATALOG, at 508 (2016), http://catalog.caltech.edu/
documents/85-catalog_16_17.pdf.
344. Id. at 596.
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students how to engage with other members of their professions
over social media. The class touches on personal privacy issues
associated with using social media platforms. 345
Even though these electives exist, they are easy to avoid. The
Data Privacy class at CalTech was offered only once in the last
three years. 346 And the course plans, recommended course
schedules, and preferred electives pushed by the school do not
include these classes. 347 Admittedly, CalTech may be a special
case; its reputation sets it apart. But the pattern was repeated
elsewhere. An engineering graduate student at Columbia
University’s Fu Foundation School for Engineering and Applied
Scientists told me that electives focusing on privacy issues in
engineering are “hidden from most students; you can avoid all of
it if you want to. These are things that I am interested in, and, as
a result, I’ve been intentional about accessing them. I can’t say the
same for my colleagues.” 348 A graduate student at the University
of Washington’s Department of Electrical Engineering noted that
she too “had to go out of [her] way” to find classes on policy, ethics,
and privacy. 349 And that’s true at most schools, even at an
engineering school like Columbia’s, which requires all of its
undergraduate engineering students to participate in the broader
college’s Core Curriculum of social science, history, and other nontechnical courses. In practice, the requirement may not help
engineers understand the social, ethical, and legal contexts in
which they do their work. As the graduate student noted, students
“can take the least relevant parts of the core, like a class on salsa
and reggae dance” 350 and still fulfill their graduation requirements
without ever taking a course on privacy.
Hiring the same types of engineers from the same types of
engineering programs with the same types of education that
neglect privacy and ethics tends to make otherwise distinct
companies look identical. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell called
this “isomorphism,” and it creates an environment where everyone
has similar perspectives on the same problem. 351 This exacerbates
345. Id. at 479.
346. Id. at 508; CAL. INST. OF T ECH., CALTECH CATALOG at 488 (2015),
http://catalog.caltech.edu/documents/1-catalog_15_16.pdf; CAL. INST. OF TECH., CALTECH
CATALOG (2014), at 483, http://catalog.caltech.edu/documents/14-catalog_14_15.pdf.
347. See Undergraduate Program, supra note 342.
348. Telephone interview with graduate student at Columbia University (Aug. 30,
2017) (notes on file with Author).
349. Interview with engineering doctoral student at the University of Washington,
Seattle, WA (Aug. 9, 2017) (notes on file with Author).
350. Id.
351. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 147, 149, 153.
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the diversity problem within the technology community and
makes individual learning and creative approaches difficult. 352 As
social networks scholars know well, it is difficult for new ideas to
break into tightly clustered homophilous networks. 353 We see this
everyday with our echo chamber networks of friends on Facebook.
In technology product design, the effect of isomorphic hiring of
engineers with similar backgrounds is the silencing of new ideas,
different perspectives, and privacy concerns.
Legal education may be increasingly embracing privacy, but
it often remains technologically averse. Only about 20-25% of law
schools offer a class in information privacy. 354 Alongside Internet
Law or Cyberlaw, information privacy courses expose students to
some technologies that implicate privacy issues. Dan Solove’s and
Paul Schwartz’s privacy law casebook, for example, includes cases
on networked technologies, heat sensors, GPS, wiretaps, email,
computers, encryption, video surveillance, online searches, and
much more. 355 But, outside of occasionally providing general
summaries of how relevant technologies work, court opinions can
only take law students so far. Most law students major in nontechnical fields in college. 356 They may now come to law school
with facility in using technology, but many lack a willingness to
understand how they work. I found some evidence of this in my
interviews with privacy lawyers in private firms. “Thank god I
don’t have to be an engineer to draft changes to a privacy policy,”
a junior attorney at a large, highly-regarded law firm in New York
352. Despite such drawbacks, employers still tend to hire from the same schools as
their competitors because it offers a sense of legitimacy in the industry. Law firms,
investment banks, and pharmaceutical companies do this, as well. See id. at 148.
353. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,
1 SOC. THEORY 201, 202 (1983). See also Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, & James M.
Cook, Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 415, 429
(2001). The original and seminal work on homophily was from two of the most American
famous social theorists of the last century, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton. See Paul
F. Lazarsfeld & Robert K. Merton, Friendship as A Social Process: A Substantive and
Methodological Analysis, in FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN MODERN SOCIETY 18–66 (M.
BERGER ED. 1954).
354. See Daniel J. Solove, Why All Law Schools Should Teach Privacy Law—and Why
Many Don’t, TEACH PRIVACY: PRIVACY + SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015),
https://www.teachprivacy.com/law-schools-teach-privacy-law-many-dont/.
355. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 180–88,
318–26, 326–35, 365–410 (5th ed. 2015).
356. According to information from the Law School Admissions Council, the ten most
common majors among law school applicants in the 2015–2016 academic year were, in order,
political science, criminal justice, psychology, English, history, economics, philosophy, arts and
humanities, sociology, and communications. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL,
UNDERGRADUATE MAJORS OF APPLICANTS TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (2016),
https://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/data-(lsac-resources)-docs/2015-16_applicants-major.pdf.
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City. 357 Another young lawyer at a different firm stated that “no
technical background required” could be the slogan for his
technology law education. 358 Partners at these firms are quick to
point out that they are eagerly searching for tech talent, even
outside the narrow confines of patent practice groups, which often
hire law students with technical degrees. 359 They recognize that
technological expertise can help: “I would love an engineer on my
cases. They look at problems differently, sure, which helps, but
sometimes a client has a new device or a problem that started
online and my 12-year-old daughter is more equipped to
understand it than I am. No joke.” 360 This kind of self-deprecation
and admission to a lack of technical skills was quite common.
Granted, lawyers do not need to be lawyers and engineers at
the same time. But lawyers’ lack of technical awareness limits
their ability to help integrate privacy into design in several ways.
First, a limited knowledge base can erode confidence in one’s
ability to affect positive change. Several in-house lawyers at major
technology companies suggested that they were disinclined to take
the initiative and reach out to engineers during design because
they “couldn’t contribute.” “I’m not a coder. I don’t want to get in
the way,” one lawyer conceded. 361 As a result, lawyers don’t get
involved even when they might be the ones most able to spot
privacy issues as they come up in design. Second, an inability to
speak with or relate to engineers on their level erodes trust. Trust
is important among members of teams. Without some level of
trust—in a worker’ technical skill, dedication to the work, and
commitment to others—team members do not have the confidence
to reflect, ask challenging questions, and solve problems. Indeed,
trust allows workers to share experiences and provides
“psychological safety” for team members to challenge each other’s
assumptions. 362 To gain that level of trust with engineers, lawyers
357. Telephone interview with associate at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (Sept. 30, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
358. Telephone interview with junior associate at litigation firm (July 28, 2017) (notes
on file with Author).
359. Technical education is a requirement of sitting for the Patent Bar Exam. See U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE, GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO
PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
4–5 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/OED_GRB.pdf. Notably, one does not
need a technical requirement to be a patent litigator or join patent-related cases.
360. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (2) (Aug. 19, 2016)
(notes on file with Author).
361. Interview with in-house attorney at mid-size technology company, San Francisco,
CA (Aug. 12, 2016) (notes on file with Author).
362. See Amy C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in
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need to “speak their language.” 363 A senior lawyer at large
technology company who serves as the legal point person for
several design teams told me that it is “important to learn about
the product, be passionate about it, do research on it so I can talk
intelligently about what my [engineers] are doing. Otherwise, my
[engineers] would see me as an impediment, not a teammate, and
I am a member of the team.” 364
Changes in both education and within the corporation can
fight isomorphism and its effects. Privacy should be integrated
into required courses for undergraduate and graduate students,
and it should be distinguished from security. The ethics of design,
along with a basic education on the legal context in which
engineers design technology products, should also be required.
Although many schools are seeing higher rates of female
applicants, schools must do a better job recruiting women, persons
of color, LGBTQ students, and other candidates from diverse
backgrounds. Notably, a similar cross-disciplinary approach to
legal education can foster greater interaction between privacy
lawyers and engineers. At Georgetown University Law Center, for
example, Paul Ohm worked with the Staff Technologist at the
school’s Center on Privacy and Technology to create a course,
“Computer Program for Lawyers: An Introduction,” to not only
train lawyers in a vital skill they can use in practice, but also to
familiarize future attorneys with the technology world in which
many of their clients work. 365 The Center also runs more informal
seminars on law and policy issues raised by new technologies. At
New York Law School, a new program, the Technology for Lawyers
Working Group, exposes law students and lawyers to important
and pervasive technologies and discusses the legal, ethic, and
policy issues they raise. This interdisciplinary education is not
meant to turn lawyers into engineers, but it can help engineers
and lawyers better relate to each other and build the trust
necessary for cooperation.
Norm diffusion and exposure to new ideas must also happen
within a company. As large networks of people working under the

Organizations: A Group-Level Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES
note 295, at 633.
363. Interview with lawyer at large technology company (Aug. 8, 2017) (notes on file
with author).
364. Id.
365. See Computer Programming for Lawyers: An Introduction, GEORGETOWN UNIV.,
https://apps.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_courses.cfm?Status=Course&Detail=272
3 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018).

AND RELATIONSHIPS, supra
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same umbrella, 366 corporations are perfectly suited to norm and
knowledge transfer. 367 Indeed, that is what social networks do:
information is exchanged through the ties that connect individuals
to others in their network and in others’ networks. 368 Therefore,
any corporation that fosters social interaction among diverse
employees from different departments will have stronger social
networks among its employees and robust platforms through
which trust can be built and experiences, ideas, and norms can be
shared. 369 Many technology companies do not do that. Some of the
engineers who work or had worked for large and mid-size Silicon
Valley technology companies noted that they often only saw or
interacted with other engineers. They sit together in open plans,
their bosses are coders, and they are often situated in buildings
that have their own cafeterias, entertainment, and fitness centers.
As a result, their networks are closed, keeping out voices that
could diversify design. 370
Several concrete steps already in place in many companies
can help deploy social networks to help embed strong privacy
norms among technologists: integrated design teams expose
engineers to other perspectives, strong affinity groups can bring
together engineers and privacy professionals, and locating
employees in a single location can make serendipitous interaction
more likely. As more of those interactions take place, the more
likely engineers will hear perspectives that challenge their
cognitive frames. That can only improve a design process plagued
by isolation, siloization, and implicit biases.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article began where Kenneth Bamberger’s and Deirdre
Mulligan’s research left off. Their book, Privacy on the Ground,
explored how leading CPOs were moving their companies far
beyond the minimal requirements of privacy law on the books. But
it was not clear that their dynamic, forward-looking, and
trust-based approach to privacy has been embedded throughout
their companies. After all, CPOs are not designers and many of
the technology products we use today seem to be designed without
366. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 148 (a corporation is a vertical, structured
network).
367. Id. at 146.
368. See Granovetter, supra note 98, at 1363–66.
369. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 154. See also Carrie R. Leana & Harry J.
Van Buren III, Organizational Social Capital and Employment Practices, in SOCIOLOGY OF
ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 295, at 41–46 (companies
can build social capital through robust employee social networks).
370. See Granovetter, supra note 98, at 1363–69.
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our privacy in mind. Given those questions, I interviewed
engineers, computer programmers, and other technologists, as
well as lawyers in private firms, to determine how, if at all, the
professionals creating products and user notices integrated
privacy into their work. This research revealed a parallel
narrative, one much more likely to make its way into design.
Where CPOs wanted to push their companies to go beyond the law,
their lawyers limited their conception of privacy to notice-andchoice. Where CPOs saw themselves as stewards of their
customers’ data in an ongoing social exchange, their engineers saw
their privacy obligations as ending with data security and
encryption. Where CPOs felt that users and evolving user
expectations were essential to their work, many technologists
resisted any role for the user in the design process. Where CPOs
wanted privacy integrated into business units, the reality on the
ground saw siloed privacy teams and engineers making privacy
decisions on the fly.
The existence of this parallel narrative suggests that robust
privacy norms are not always trickling down from the CPOs to
their designers on the ground. This is not to say that those norms
never reach designers. There are many technology company
employees working earnestly to create exciting products and
platforms while protecting privacy. This Article is not to meant to
suggest otherwise. But there are still barriers to privacy by design
at some companies. This Article proposed a four-tiered approach
for both understanding those barriers and suggesting how to fix
them. Ambiguous privacy theory, significant gaps in privacy law,
siloization and misplaced priorities within the corporation, and
homogenous design teams are ossifying technologists’ perspectives
and creating resistance to the CPOs’ vision of privacy. Changes at
each level, however, could both incentivize companies to take
privacy seriously and enhance organizational learning and
change.
This research is necessarily limited. Ethnographic research is
subject to response biases where respondents try to give the
answers they think the researcher wants to hear. My observations
of design meetings are particularly susceptible to these biases.
Also, a small group of interviews based on snowball sampling
cannot represent the population of technologists as a whole,
limiting the generalizability of this research. Undoubtedly, there
are companies that do better than others at integrating privacy
into the design process. Further research will discuss how certain
businesses in certain industries manage to be more successful at
making robust privacy norms part of the routine of every
employee. Generalizing to the entire technology industry is not the
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goal of this Article. Rather, it speaks to a world in which the
privacy goals set by CPOs at the top of a corporation may not be
fully realized. This may, in some cases, prevent robust privacy
norms from making their way into design.
Despite any research limitations, this Article points to several
avenues for future research. A longitudinal study comparing the
privacy elements of products from agile design teams with those of
siloed, homogenous teams could prove the impact of diversity and
integrated teams on privacy by design. Additional research on
technology education is needed to determine how best to integrate
ethics, diversity, and privacy into computer science and
engineering curricula. And quantitative research can assess the
impact of organizational changes, team demographics, and other
factors on user trust in a company. These projects are all planned
or in progress. This Article is just one step in a larger research
agenda on making privacy by design more of a reality than a
buzzword.

